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ABSTRACT 
On January 11, 2007, China successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. 
This thesis seeks to view the test’s implications with regards to the prospect of China 
holding a false impression of offense dominance by using its ASAT weapon to 
temporarily create a shift in the strategic balance between it and the United States. 
Although China announced to the world that its test was not directed at any one country, 
its military strategic observers have assumed to identify the strategic weakness of the 
United States military as its reliance on space assets. The United States Navy surface 
force is the largest customer of space-based assets, and U.S. naval surface forces could be 
expected to deploy to the Taiwan Straits if tensions between Taipei and Beijing elevate. 
China may be tempted to use to use its newly tested capabilities in a potential contest 
concerning the future of Taiwan, and this could potentially expose U.S. naval forces to an 
environment of degraded space assets. This thesis seeks to examine China’s perception of 
these weapons in offense-defense terms and shows that China’s leadership may over 
estimate the expected advantage of an ASAT weapon attack. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
For nearly fifty years, space based assets have provided the United States with a 
substantial set of tools for maintaining a strategic balance. During the Cold War, space 
based reconnaissance provided American intelligence professionals with detailed 
information concerning disposition of opposing forces, military industrial capacity and 
targeting information. Over the course of the last two decades, space based assets have 
become increasingly incorporated into a wide range of U.S. military applications. The 
first Gulf War, Kosovo War and the continued War on Terror all provide examples of the 
United States reliance on these assets to deliver a considerable amount of hard power 
with timely and efficient results. Any threat to U.S. space assets could potentially limit 
the ability of the U.S. to effectively project military power in a time of crisis.  
China’s military modernization intended to fight “local wars under conditions of 
informatization,” has recently reached a new plateau: a successful demonstration of an 
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon (fanweixing).1 On January 11, 2007, China destroyed a low 
earth orbit satellite. Although the weapon may not be the sole determinant in a military 
struggle, it does represent a milestone worthy of consideration. China’s military 
modernization is intended to be able to fight a short duration conflict with highly 
technical weapons that incorporate surprise to gain the upper hand early in the conflict.2 
A likely scenario that could lead to the use of an ASAT against U.S. space assets is a 
Taiwan contingency. If used as a first strike weapon in a Taiwan Strait conflict, the U.S. 
Navy could potentially be forced to operate in an environment in which space assets 
become the first targets.  
Since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S. Navy, Seventh Fleet, 
has maintained a continued presence in the Taiwan Strait in times of elevated tensions 
                                                 
1 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (California, 
University of California Press, 2002), 83. For a discussion of China’s evolving doctrine and training, see 
Chapter III.  The term informatization is used by the Chinese to describe their military modernization.    
2 Richard A. Bitzinger, “China’s Revolution in Military Affairs: Good Enough for Government 
Work,” RSIS Commentaries, 2, www.rsis.edu.sg (accessed June 6, 2008).  
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between the governments of Taiwan and China.3 Additionally, the United States is the 
largest customer of space assets, and any disruption to these assets could prove 
challenging for U.S. naval surface forces.4 Currently, the U.S. naval surface forces use 
space for several mission related areas supporting Sea Power 21.5 Reconnaissance 
satellites provide the Sea Power 21 concept with several assets such as ocean and littoral 
observation, locating opposition forces, assistance in the determination of counter force 
measures and targeting. Communication satellites provide vast amounts of data used to 
exchange vital information, and Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) assist in 
maneuvering and targeting data for complex weapon systems. Space systems have 
become an embedded element of U.S. naval surface warfare.  
During the 1996 Taiwan Crisis, the Chinese learned that the U.S. Navy could be 
expected to maintain a presence if Beijing were to use force against the island of 
Taiwan.6 Joan Johnson-Freese states that China’s military modernization is directed 
against U.S. interference in a Taiwan conflict.7 For whatever reason, national prestige, 
strategic relevance, internal unrest and the need for governing legitimacy, or secure its 
increasing demand for energy, if China’ leaders feel that Taiwan’s separation from the  
 
 
                                                 
3 See Chen Juan, Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapter Seven for brief history of China’s Taiwan 
policy in the 1950’s: Chen Juan, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001), 163-204.  
4 Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 11. Friedman raises the question of how long the U.S. Navy 
will enjoy the freedom of movement in blue water as other navies gain advantages by exploiting space.  
5 The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 2005), 58, https://www.nap.edu (accessed June 3, 2008).  
6 Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 3. Also, Secretary 
of the Navy, Donald C. Winter, on February 7, 2007, between discussing operating near choke points and 
China’s military modernization stated that China is moving towards confronting the U.S. Navy. Donald C. 
Winter, “Navy Transformation: A Stable, Long-Term View,” March 19, 2007, Heritage Lecture 1004, 
http://www.heritage.org (accessed July 28, 2007).  
7 Joan Johnson-Freese, “China’s Space Ambitions,” (2007), 18. “Let’s be clear: Chinese military 
strategy, planning and capability development is first and foremost about Taiwan. If China would intervene 
on behalf of Taiwan, China’s best option might be to hold the United States at bay for some minimal 
amount of time, 48 hours for example, to pressure Taiwan into acquiescence.”  
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mainland is no longer in their best interest, they could move forcefully to reunite it.8 The 
situation remains a tinderbox and more than likely the U.S. Navy would be required to 
maintain regional presence if hostilities were to erupt.  
In 2005, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Annual Report to 
Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China suggested that China’s 
leaders might overestimate its military capabilities, thereby possibly leading it to 
miscalculation and crisis; this point has been iterated every successive year.9 In last 
fifteen years, China has sought to modernize its military while maintaining the position 
that Taiwan remains part of the Chinese mainland. Three years have passed since China 
issued the Anti-Succession Law that not only intends to check Taiwan’s secession from 
China but also implies that China is willing to use force to protect its territorial integrity 
if peaceful reunification does not seem possible.10 In addition, China’s military intentions 
are for the most part unknown and appear to be moving closer to eventually using force 
against Taiwan.    
What factors shaped the Chinese perception that developing an ASAT weapon 
would enhance their position with regards to Taiwan? An examination of China’s 
perceptions leading to the development of the ASAT weapon might provide insight on 
how this weapon might eventually be used and also how it contributes to the likelihood of 
war. Second, what implications does the possible use of this of this ASAT weapon have 
upon the United States naval surface forces? Could the United States suffer from a Space 
Pearl Harbor as a result of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait? A war game conducted at the 
Naval War College in 1994 concluded that an attack of U.S. space assets over the Taiwan 
Strait provided China a victory over the U.S. Seventh Fleet.11  
                                                 
8 See Chapter Seven of Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 181-211.  
9 Dennis J. Blasko, “The Pentagon-PLA Disconnect: China’s Self Assessments of Its Military 
Capabilities,” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation 8, no. 14 (2008): 10, http://www.jamestown.org 
(accessed July 5, 2008).  
10 “The Anti-Secession Law,” The People’s Daily Online, (March 14, 2005), http://english.people.com 
(accessed June 19, 2008). 
11 Steven Lambakis, “Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond,” Orbis 39, no. 3 (1995): 417-433.  
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It might be difficult to answer all these questions without taking into 
consideration information that may not be readily available such as the perceptions of the 
Chinese elites that eventually might lead to the employment of the ASAT weapon. 
Kenneth Waltz, on the other hand, suggests that human nature cannot possibility be the 
sole determinant concerning the use of force.12 However, by examining the elements 
leading China to develop the ASAT weapon might provide insight into how they perceive 
the weapon. Does China feel that possessing the weapon will enable them to create a shift 
in the balance of power between it and the United States? The factors leading China to 
develop the weapon collectively suggest that China in under the impression that it could 
create a temporary shift in the balance of power between it and the United States; 
additionally, an examination of political and strategic perceptions followed by testing 
them against operational realities may present an overestimation of U.S. vulnerabilities to 
an ASAT threat. Could a Chinese misunderstanding about its ASAT capabilities pose a 
threat to U.S. naval forces and lead to war?   
Discussing the phenomena of uncertainly, and the development and use of 
weapons in war, Thomas Schelling wrote, “It is the weapons, organization, plans, 
geography, communications, warning systems, intelligence, and even beliefs and 
doctrines about the conduct of war that together have this influence.”13 Discussing the 
character of states and the propensity toward peace and war, Thomas C. Schelling states:  
There is, then, something we might call the ‘inherent propensity toward 
peace or war embodied in weaponry, the geography and the military 
organization of the time. Arms and military organizations can hardly be 
considered the exclusively determining factors in international conflict, 
but neither can they be considered neutral. The weaponry does affect the 
outlook for war and peace. For good or ill the weaponry can determine the 
calculations, the expectations, the decisions, the character of crisis, the 
evaluation of danger and the very processes by which war gets 
underway.14  
                                                 
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2001), 80-81.  
13 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), 234. 
14 Ibid., 234. Also, Stephen Van Evera observes Schelling’s character of war and peace in his Offense, 
Defense and the Causes of War Theory. See: Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of 
War,” International Security 22 no. 4 (1998): 9.  
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Expanding on this idea of the inherent propensity towards war or peace, Stephen 
Van Evera explores the causes of war and defines five. Two of these hypotheses are 
important to this thesis: First, war is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism 
about its outcome; and, second, war is more likely when the advantage lies with the first 
side to mobilize or attack.15 These two hypotheses are concerned with perceptions that 
eventually lead to war.  
Although weaponry might be part of the causes of war, it is not the single 
determining factor leading to the decision to go to war. The perception of a war’s 
outcome is the cause war, and sometimes the perception of the possible effectiveness of 
weaponry leads to the idea that victory will be easier to achieve. The perception that 
victory can be achieved easily is called offense dominance. Offense dominance can be 
real or imagined to be real.16 The false illusion of offense dominance is called false 
optimism. False optimism raises the risk of war in two ways; first, false optimism leads 
the loser to join wars they would otherwise not if they had foresaw the future.17 Second, 
the sense of false optimism also leads states to drive a crisis to the brink.18 History has 
many examples of wars breaking out as a result of false optimism.19  
Offense dominance, real or perceived, is an aggregate of military technology, 
national structures, geographic structures, and military factors.20 In addition to these 
aggregate factors there are two contributing factors leading to false optimism: first-move 
advantage and the sense of offense dominance caused by secrecy.21 Therefore, offense 
dominance can be real or imagined, and it consists of aggregate elements. If a nation has 
false optimism then it harbors benefits of the first move advantage and keeps its military 
intentions secret.  
                                                 
15 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 4.  
16 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War,” 6.  
17 Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, 24.  
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 17-24.  
20 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War,” 6. 
21 Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, 24.  
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Therefore, one way of analyzing the potential implications of the ASAT weapon 
upon U.S. naval surface forces is to consider these aggregate features of offense 
dominance against the backdrop of events leading China to develop an ASAT weapon. 
Consideration of these factors could provide support for the argument that China’s 
perception of the ASAT weapon will allow it to create a shift in the balance of power, 
therefore creating a situation of offense dominance.  
B.  THESIS QUESTION 
What value does China perceive in possessing ASAT weapons and how might 
these weapons be used against U.S. Navy surface forces while operating against the 
Chinese in a contest over Taiwan’s future? More specifically, what elements led the 
Chinese to develop the ASAT weapon, and how do these examples support the claim that 
China carries false optimism about being able to create a shift in the balance of power? 
Furthermore, what is the possibility that China is able to create a shift in the balance of 
power balance between it and the United States Navy by attacking U.S. space assets? 
This thesis intends to explore these questions in light of Stephen Van Evera’s theory, 
Offense, Defense and the Causes of War Theory (ODT). By examining the aggregate 
factors of offense dominance, it will be demonstrated that China perceives the utility of 
ASAT weapons as being able to create a situation of offense defense. The aggregate 
factors of offense dominance identified by Van Evera are also areas of contention 
between the U.S. and China; and in each case, the Chinese possession of an ASAT 
weapon could theoretically be used to counter possible U.S. intervention in a Taiwan 
Strait Crisis. It will be argued that the Chinese sense of offense dominance is not reality, 
rather a case of false optimism. Because ASAT weapons are difficult to deploy in secrecy 
and their effects on U.S. surface forces marginalized by redundancy and alternate weapon 
employment methods.  
C.  RELEVANCE TO U.S. NAVY  
Unlike the United States, China’s leadership does not make public its military 
strategy or doctrine; this thesis will help us to understand further a core element on 
Chinese strategy. Since October 5, 1999, U.S. public law, National Defense 
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Authorization Act, 2000, requires that the Secretary of Defense submit an annual report 
to Congress on the military strategy of the People’s Republic of China. The most recent 
report, 2008, states, “much uncertainty surrounds China’s future in the area of its 
expanding military power and how that power might be used.”22 Ronald O’Rourke, a 
noted naval analyst at CRS who has followed China’s modernization for over a decade, 
states:  
Some observers believe that China wants its modernized military to be 
capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force –a force that can deter 
U.S. intervention, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the 
effectiveness of U.S. intervention forces, particularly U.S. naval and air 
forces.23  
Additionally, Roger Cliff, of the RAND Corporation, states defense analysts have 
recently become concerned about a possible ‘anti-access’ strategy that China might 
employ in a theater of battle with the United States and that there has not been 
assessments that address this issue.24 “Chinese strategists view the U.S. information 
network as one of its most vital key points to target because of disrupting U.S. 
communication and critical command-and-control centers would leave the affected U.S. 
forces in a ‘state of paralysis.’”25 An attack on U.S. space assets could place the U.S. 
naval surface forces in an environment unknown; U.S. naval forces depend on space and 
will continue to do so in the future.26  
It is critical that discussion on this emerging threat be made relevant to today’s 
planning for future naval operations when it appears that China’s see itself being able to 
shift the strategic balance of power in its favor.   
                                                 
22 United States Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008 
(Washington, D.C., 2008), 1, http://www.defenselink.mil (accessed March 25, 2008). 
23 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for the U.S. Navy Capabilities – 
Background and Issues for Congress,” (CRS), #RL33153 (2008): 41, http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/ 
(accessed July 2008). 
24 Roger Cliff and others, Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their 
Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), iii, www.rand.org (accessed 
February 3, 2008).  
25 Ibid., 51.  
26 Naval Studies Board, The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities (Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 2005), 1, http://books.nap.edu (accessed January 24, 2008). 
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D.  ORGANIZATION  
This thesis seeks to understand the Chinese perceptions concerning its ASAT 
weapon and the operational implications of the ASAT weapon with regards to the U.S. 
Navy surface forces. Within a strategic theoretical dimension, specifically, could the 
Chinese ASAT weapon create an operational advantage that tips a strategic decision to go 
to war? The primary question will be addressed while being viewed through the lens of 
Stephen Van Evera’s Offense, Defense and the Causes of War Theory (ODT).27 This 
thesis will first be structured to address the central operational question, but it will seek to 
explore how the Chinese perceive the weapon and what appears to be reality based on an 
evaluation of U.S. military space assets.  
Chapter II will explore Chinese perceptions concerning the ASAT weapon, and 
evaluate whether their perceptions constitute a form of offense dominance. A complete 
understanding of the Chinese leadership’s perception of the ASAT weapon could be 
impossible to measure; however, this chapter will explore the aggregate factors leading to 
offense defense such as the weapon’s technology, national security structure, 
geographical factors and the military factors. In the end, this chapter hopes to bring light 
the Chinese perception of offense dominance and highlighting that China’s insistence of 
maintaining military secrecy and a first move advantage to create a shift in the balance of 
power in war is a sign that it might harbor false optimism.  
Chapter III will expose Chinese false optimism by evaluating a first strike 
scenario on U.S. space assets. Three critical space need areas of Sea Power 21 will be 
evaluated: reconnaissance, global positioning and communications. The risk of 
reconnaissance satellites will be examined, followed by possible targeting of GPS 





                                                 
27 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” 5-43.  
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event of a worst-case scenario China could not create a shift in the offense balance. It will 
also demonstrate that as a result of its false optimism, China appears to be readying for 
future conflict with the United States after the ASAT test.    
The fourth chapter will conclude this thesis and discuss its implications for 
stability in the region and U.S. interests.  
  10
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II. CHINA’S PERCEPTION OF OFFENSE DOMINANCE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Offense dominance is the assessment that military victory can be easily achieved. 
The perception that victory can be easily achieved is a combination of the aggregate 
factors of offense dominance to include the military technology, geography, social 
structures and military organizations of the time. This chapter explores these aggregate 
factors of Chinese offense dominance in light of its decision to develop an ASAT 
weapon. Each aggregate factor is also an area of contention between China and the 
United States. This chapter seeks to support the claim that China developed its ASAT 
weapon as a means to shift the strategic balance of power in its favor; and China 
maintains an offense dominant mentality. This chapter will begin by examining a 
situation of war in the Taiwan Strait that results from China’s impression of offense 
dominance. It hopes to highlight the vulnerability of war in the region resulting from 
China’s sense of offense dominance. Next, this chapter will discuss the aggregate factors 
of offense dominance. In the end, this chapter it will point out Van Evera’s two causes of 
false optimism, secrecy and the emphasis on using the first move. Although this chapter 
may not be able to provide compelling evidence that China harbors false optimism, it will 
provide a foundation for the third chapter that will expose China’s sense of false 
optimism.    
B.  OFFENSE DOMINANCE’S CONSEQUENCES 
A war starting in the Taiwan Strait could begin under conditions that could have 
otherwise been settled by cooperative measures. However, when a country possesses the 
sense the victory can be easily achieved, the need to cooperate with other countries 
carries less importance.28 The following imaginary but plausible Taiwan Strait scenario is 
one example of war stemming from a sense of offense dominance: 
                                                 
28 Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, 24.  
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A Chinese flagged vessel engaged in human trafficking leaves from a port located 
in Fujian Province and experiences engine trouble at its closest point of approach to 
Taiwan. Prevailing westerly winds blow the troubled vessel into Taiwanese waters; the 
Republic of China’s (ROC) Navy sends one of its vessels to interdict this unknown 
contact. As the ROC naval vessel nears, the troubled vessel’s captain decides to throw the 
charts over the side, fearing the Taiwanese government will discover the ship’s cargo. 
Upon noticing possible evidence being thrown over the side, the Taiwan naval vessels 
chooses to close the suspect vessel as quickly as possible. However, the two ships end up 
colliding, causing fire and flooding. Most of the smuggled Chinese nationals are killed 
instantly and their bodies are dumped into the waters of the strait. Before both vessels 
sink, they transmit situation reports to their respective countries.  
As a result of the historical tension between Taiwan and China, and China’s sense 
of false optimism stemming from its recent development of its ASAT weapon, the 
situation quickly spirals out of control. A PLAN naval vessel, close enough to respond, 
overhears the mayday transmissions, requests and receives permission to heads to the 
scene. Meanwhile, Taiwan authorities sortie an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to the 
location of Taiwanese sailors now awaiting retrieval. As the responding Chinese naval 
vessel continues to uses caution approaching the collision since, its location with regard 
to Taiwan’s territorial waters becomes questionable. Yet, the PLAN vessel continues to 
pick up Chinese survivors from the water in addition to a single Taiwanese sailor.  
The situation turns dangerous. Circling the collision scene from high above, the 
Taiwanese UAV transmits a clear image of its sailor being retrieved from the waters by 
the PLAN vessel’s crewmembers. Minutes later, as the UAV comes to the edge of its 
territorial envelop, the live video feed ends with an abrupt static. The UAV’s location 
becomes undetectable from sensors located on Taiwan. The search for the UAV is in 
vain; it has been shot down by the PLA. A half an hour later, the Taiwanese President is 
briefed on the situation and makes a public statement that is quickly relayed across the 
strait: China has interfered with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation and seeks to 
have its military member returned safely. Taiwan insists that China respect Taiwan’s 
territorial integrity in the future. Upon hearing the statement from Taiwan’s President, 
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China’s President Hu Jintao asks the PLA’s leadership if it can use force to reunify 
Taiwan. The answer is “Yes.” The order to reunify Taiwan by force is given by means of 
a naval blockade aimed at stalling American intervention. War has begun. Within two 
hours of the collision, China’s president makes a public address stating the Taiwan 
separatist forces have invoked China’s use of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. China’s 
leaders feel they have no other choice. The Taiwanese President’s statement would most 
likely been transmitted via the Internet into millions of Chinese homes. China’s elite will 
not risk humiliation of Taiwan referring to itself as a sovereign country, and China now 
possesses an ASAT weapon and assumes that can be used to create a temporal shift in the 
military balance between it and the United States, long enough for Taiwan to capitulate.  
While the U.S. Ambassador to China is speaking directly with the President of the 
United States and the Secretary of State, a U.S. reconnaissance satellite stops its 
transmission as it passes over parts of western China. Within minutes, the United States 
has confirmation that a missile fired from Chinese territory, most likely from a mobile 
launcher located along the Taklimakan Desert Highway has intercepted a U.S. military 
reconnaissance satellite in low earth orbit. This attack is followed by simultaneous 
attacks on eight other U.S. assets in the same orbit. Before the destruction of these 
reconnaissance satellites, China’s submarines were accounted for in their slips; however, 
when another reconnaissance satellite is finally able to survey the same Chinese 
submarine facilities, all the submarines are all gone. The U.S. Seventh Fleet is dispatched 
to the region.  
The above scenario illustrates that weapons do not cause wars, but the perception 
of victory is generally required for war to break out. By exploring the reasons behind 
China’s decision to develop an ASAT weapon, it might provide insight to its perception 
about being able to create a shift the strategic balance.  
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C.  AGGREGATE FACTORS OF OFFENSE DOMINANCE  
1.  Military Technology 
States can change the offense or defense balance through wartime military 
actions.29 The means to accomplish this shift in the offense or defense balance, via the 
application of force, is made possible from weaponry. As power countries such as the 
United States rely upon weapon systems that have become more technically dependent on 
space, it appears logical that weapons designed to counter this arena become part of a 
potential adversary’s military arsenal. This is especially true of China that is in the midst 
of military modernization that appears to be oriented towards creating a force capable of 
using force against Taiwan. The Chinese perceive the ASAT weapon as a strategic force 
enhancer.  The technological achievements of this weapon coupled with the potential 
implications this weapon carries towards the United States military deepens this 
perception.  
The Chinese ASAT test was a grounding breaking accomplishment toward their 
military modernization goals. Demonstrated in the morning hours of January 12, 2007, 
Xichang Space Center, Sichuan China, an aging Chinese weather satellite, Fengyun-1C, 
was intercepted five hundred and thirty miles above the earth’s surface by a Chinese 
ASAT weapon. This ASAT was a Dong Feng 21 (DF-21) missile, four stage, solid fuel, 
armed with a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV).30 The United States intelligence community has 
labeled this Chinese ASAT weapon the CS-19.31 This test marked the first satellite 
destroyed in low earth orbit (LEO) in twenty-seven years, and places China behind the 
United States and the former Soviet Union in the ability to destroy satellites without the 
use of nuclear weapons. This test was the fourth ASAT attempt for China; it tested three 
other ASAT weapons between September 2004 and February 2006.32  
                                                 
29 Van Evera, “Offense, Defense and the Causes of War,” 18.  
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The Chinese demonstration was different from the two last Cold War ASAT tests. 
The last American ASAT test was conducted in 1985, and it consisted of an air-launched 
anti-satellite multi-staged missile (ASM) strapped to an F-15 and fired 300 miles at its 
target, a satellite known as Solwind P78-1.33 The ASM-135 weapon demonstration was 
unequal to any ASAT weapon of its time; the satellite-attacking missile was launched at 
an altitude of 31,000 ft and fired from an angle of sixty-five degrees.34 The Chinese 
ASAT demonstration, on the other hand, was launched from the Xichang Space Center. It 
was fired from a mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL).35 This implies that China 
could potentially fire this weapon from remote locations without the need of a launch pad 
and could potentially use cover to conceal its location. Additionally, the satellite’s 
destruction created an estimated 35,000 pieces of space debris.36 Geoffrey Forden, 
former United Nations (UN) weapons inspector and Strategic Weapon Analyst at the 
Congressional Budget Office, observes:  
This means that China accomplished the most sophisticated of space 
maneuvers: a hit-to-kill interception, the equivalent of hitting a bullet with 
a bullet. This is equivalent to what the US is trying to develop in its 
national missile defense system and is much more sophisticated than the 
ASAT the Soviet Union was working in the 1980s: little more than a space 
mine that slowly snuck up on its target and detonated near by.37 
The CS-19 most likely employed an onboard telescope that requires the sun’s 
light to intercept its target; however, targets operating in higher altitudes such as Global 
Positioning Satellites (GPS) would not require such a telescope due to the constant 
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position in the sun’s light.38 In addition to the KKV armed ASAT weapon, in October 
2006, Donald Kerr, Director of the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), 
confirmed that China used a ground-based laser to illuminate a U.S. reconnaissance 
satellite over its territory.39 Details of this event have not been made public; however, it 
can be assumed that China has at least two ASAT weapons. China appears to have placed 
great importance to the development of these weapons. The development and 
demonstration of two ASAT weapons within a short period of time is impressive for a 
country in the midst of the military modernization intended to fight short duration wars, 
especially in light of U.S. reliance on space. See Figure 1: Chinese ASAT and Mobile 
Road Launcher. 
Although the Chinese ASAT test was a major accomplishment that had only been 
previously achieved by the U.S. and Soviet Union, the official Chinese response came 
two weeks following the test, stating that the ASAT demonstration was not directed at 
any one country in particular.40 Others speculate that there are drastic implications to the 
future security of U.S. space assets.  
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Figure 1.   Chinese ASAT and Mobile Road Launcher.41 
It appears the Chinese ASAT weapon posses a possible challenge to the ability of 
the United States to project its military power. Ironically, the Chinese anti-satellite 
(ASAT) test came exactly six years to the day, local time in Washington, D.C., January 
11, 2001, that the “Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization’s” report was submitted as pertained to public law 106-
65.42 This report, also known as the Rumsfeld Space Commission, named after the 
commission’s chair and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, states that 
not only is the U.S. dependence on space a vulnerability that makes it “potentially 
attractive target,” it also states, “in particular, the Department of Defense and the 
Intelligence Community is not yet arranged or focused to meet the national security space 
needs of the 21st century.”43 The report’s infamous warning states that the U.S. could 
suffer from a “Space Pearl Harbor.”44   
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Unsurprisingly, on April 24, 2007, United States Air Force (USAF) Chief of 
Staff, General Michael Moseley, stated the Chinese ASAT test was as ‘strategically 
dislocating’ as the 1957 launch of Sputnik.45 Since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
conception of “limited war under high-technology conditions,” or its current reference as 
“local wars under conditions of informatization,” China’s military writings have 
identified space as the Achilles’ heel of American military operations.46 Writing about 
the modernization of the Chinese military in space, Mark Stokes observed in 1999 that, 
“China’s strategic modernization, if successful, will enable the PLA to conduct 
operations intended to directly achieve strategic effects by striking the enemy’s center of 
gravity.”47 Chinese strategic thought emphasizing attacks on space assets started to gain 
momentum after 1999. This newly forming military ideology stressed the development of 
weapons referred to as “assassin’s mace” in combination with a doctrine referred to as 
“The Inferior Defeats the Superior.”48 The adoption of this ideology had huge 
implications toward the development of the ASAT weapon (discussed below).  
The most recent Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s 
Republic of China 2008 states that China’s January 2007 ASAT test “demonstrated that 
the PLA’s interest in counter-space systems is more than theoretical.”49 This ASAT test 
could signal that Chinese are moving closer, or assume they are moving closer, to 
achieving the military modernization of being able to “fight a local war under 
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informationized conditions,” and create a situation of area-access denial that allows the 
Chinese the ability to fight a asymmetric naval campaign against the United States.50  
The Chinese ASAT weapon runs counter to the United States use of space. The 
Chinese are certainly aware of this fact. Most importantly, the ASAT weapon poses a 
threat to U.S. dominance in space and ability to project military power is an important 
element that enables China to perceive the weapon as being capable of shifting the 
balance of power. The development of the weapon is the ultimate symbol of its offense 
dominant position. However, the weapon alone cannot explain China’s perception of 
offense dominance.   
2.  China’s Security Structure  
China’s view of the security environment after the Cold War and the continued 
separation of Taiwan from the mainland have continued to be a catalyst for its military 
modernization. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, 
China has never had a more secure security environment. The land border disputes with 
India, the former Soviet Union and Vietnam are no longer situations that might cause 
war; and, as a result, China has turned towards its coastal periphery to guard against 
possible threats.51 Although China has adopted a policy of positively engaging their 
maritime neighbors, it appears that it will never give up its “sovereign claims.”52 This is 
certainly the case with Taiwan, which China continually insists that it is part of its 
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mainland. Noted Chinese naval strategists Bernard Cole states that China’s intentions 
along its eastern periphery, to include Taiwan, could be described a being a “Great Wall 
at Sea.”53 It appears that China’s anti-access strategy supports this claim.   
A year after the show of American naval force during the 1996 Taiwan Crisis, 
China started to promote its view of the international security scene by emphasizing the 
“New Security Concept” (NSC). China’s NSC is, “China’s alternative vision for regional 
and global international relations and security.”54 There are four reasons for adopting the 
NSC: China’s concern for what it sees as American hegemony; China’s need to settle its 
disputes by force; Beijing’s aspirations of having global status; and finally, the NCS was 
a reaction to the expansion of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
other U.S. bilateral military agreements in the region that Beijing views as directed 
towards the security of Taiwan.55 David Shambaugh, a noted observer of China’s 
military modernization, states that the NSC should not be taken lightly.56 All four of 
these factors of the NSC run counter to the interest of the United States. Additionally, 
“Although, the new security concept states that nations should not resort to military 
threats or aggression, the PRC still refuses to withdraw its threats of force against Taiwan 
if it declares independence because Beijing considers Taiwan sovereignty an internal 
matter.”57  China’ position regarding Taiwan is central to the NSC and its decision to 
develop the ability to counter the United States in space.    
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Furthermore, many of China’s leaders view the Taiwan issue as being the last in a 
series of conflicts from the Century of Humiliation (1842-1949) and the Chinese Civil 
War (1927-1949).58 However, China learned that during the 1996 Taiwan Crisis it would 
have to confront the United States if it wanted to reunify the Island of Taiwan with the 
mainland.59 China’s position regarding Taiwan remains firm, as expressed in its 2000 
White Paper titled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.”60 This white paper 
states that China has long sought a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but it has not been 
successful due to “foreign forces.”61 Officially China states, “Taiwan’s status is an 
inalienable part of China has been determined and cannot be changed. “Self-
determination” for Taiwan is out of the question.”62 This clear tone regarding the future 
of Taiwan independence surely is intended for outsiders that might consider Taiwan’s 
independence an international matter, namely the United States (the 1979 Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) discussed below). As a result of its Taiwan stance, China’s military 
modernization was restructured after the 1996 Taiwan Crisis to afford it the possibility of 
confronting the United States over Taiwan.63 James Mulvenon and Murray Scot Tanner 
point out that the goal of keeping Taiwan from establishing permanent separation as the 
greatest impact on the military modernization than any other national security goal.64  
China’s ASAT weapon appears to be a critical element in obtaining this goal.    
Additionally, the Chinese government’s message concerning Taiwan’s 
sovereignty was again made clear in the 2005 Anti-Succession Law, but this time, the 
language indicated the use of force could be used if peaceful means are not apparent. 
Article Eight of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law states:  
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In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act 
under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession 
from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from 
China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should 
be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and 
other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.65 
Even before the Chinese government had issued strong legal terms concerning its 
position on Taiwan, a senior Chinese official from the Academy of Military Science 
stated that China would risk reunification with Taiwan at the expense of its economic 
growth.66 Even as recently as 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China would 
“pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland.”67 The strongest indication that 
China is willing to use force against Taiwan and places great emphasis in the 
development of weapons designed to give China a military advantage is a statement from 
Jiang Zemin. During a 1999 gathering of China’s elites, Jiang asked China’s military 
generals if they could prevail against the United States in a contest over Taiwan.68 Being 
told it was not possible to China to currently succeed, Jiang promised the PLA generals, 
“We are going to give to you everything you need so that next time you are asked the 
same question, you can say yes.”69  
It appears that 1999 was an important year in China’s decision to develop an 
ASAT weapon.  
The position of the United States concerning Taiwan appears to be in opposition 
to that of China. Since the U.S. shift of recognition to PRC as the official government of 
China, the defense of Taiwan has remained a vague aspect of U.S. policy. Although the 
Shanghai Communiqué expressed America’s support for a One-China policy, it did not 
overtly recognize the PRC’s 1949 victory over the Kuomintang of China (KMT) in 
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Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (1979), Section 3301, subset (b) line items 2-4, states 
that the United States seeks peace in the region, and the U.S. shift in recognition of 
China’s government is weighted on Taiwan’s future being settled under peaceful terms.70 
Most importantly, it states, “to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by 
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.”71 As 
discussed above, the 1996 Taiwan Crisis and the U.S. response to it made clear that the 
United States would take any threat to Taiwan seriously. President Bush further indicated 
continued U.S. support for Taiwan by stating that the United States would take military 
actions that were appropriate for the security of Taiwan.72  The 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States paid attention to Taiwan’s security by stating that, although 
China was the fourth largest trading partner with the United States, there remains a 
difference in opinions between the two countries such as the Taiwan Relations Act.73 The 
most recent National Security Strategy of the United States (2006) stated that China and 
Taiwan must resolve their differences peacefully.74  It is likely that the United States 
would consider any forceful move against Taiwan as being a destabilizing factor in Asia 
and would most likely respond with a military presence.   
Additionally, fear of American hegemony in space not only runs counter China’s 
reunification ambitions with Taiwan; it also threatens China’s ability to maintain a 
credible nuclear threat. First, some Chinese military strategists have concluded that the 
United States is moving in the direction of eventual space weaponization and space 
dominance.75 Certainly, U.S. dominance in space could be a potential problem for China 
if it must eventually take Taiwan by force. One PLA Senior Colonel stated that China 
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would like to see the peaceful use of space but it appears that it will be weaponized.76 
Second, the notion of space and nuclear security are closely related. U.S. strategic plans 
for national missile defense such as its Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), is 
viewed as potentially securing defense and offense measures.77 In 2002, the United States 
withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to guard against potential missile 
attacks. U.S. GMB could leave China without a credible nuclear deterrent.78 Certainly, 
the recent successful U.S. test of an ASAT weapon fired from an Aegis cruiser 
perpetuates this space hegemony perception. One senior researcher for China’s Academy 
of Military Science has concluded, “China must seek counter-measures to deal with this 
problem accordingly.”79 China’s People’s Daily Online has referred to the U.S. plan for a 
regional missile defense as an example of its efforts to maintain a Cold War mentality.80 
This shield, claims this news article, would consist of a multi-layered defense situated 
along China’s first island chain.81 
China’s perception of its security situation and its position regarding Taiwan’s 
independence are both in opposition to the position of the United States. China’s long-
standing territorial claim over Taiwan is central in its dealings with the United States. 
China sees no possibility of unifying Taiwan by force without having to confront the U.S. 
military, and this is something it is unable to due without taking advantage of what it 
perceives as the United States strategic weakness in space. China views American 
hegemony and its dominant position in space as a continued threat to its security and the 
means by which the U.S. is able to continually humiliate China’s leadership by keeping it 
from being able re-unify with Taiwan. Legislation designed to move China closer to 
Taiwan has created the need to modernize its military with weapons capable of blunting 
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U.S. power projection. China feels it has little option but to create technology such as the 
ASAT weapon that could be used to create a shift in the strategic. China’s security 
concerns have lead it to believe that the best way to secure their interest is to build 
weapons that are capable of blunting U.S. military power.      
3.  Geographical Factors of Chinese Offense Dominance 
Conquest is made difficult when there are natural buffers between foes including 
third parties.82 Not only can this be the case of the United States’ security concerns with 
Taiwan, but also the geographical situation. China’s position concerning Taiwan not only 
includes its perception of ending its national reunification and period of humiliation, 
Taiwan’s strategic position could unlock China from the first island chain that contains 
its eastern seaboard. With China looking towards the east for its security concerns, it 
would best serve China to break out of the constraining waters of the South China Sea 
and into strategic safer waters of the greater Pacific Ocean. Taiwan is the prized 
geographical feature that offers China better security prospects.   
Since its 1949 conception, the PRC has always considered Taiwan part of its 
territory. However, its changing strategic posture has also brought changes in its 
territorial claims along its seaboard periphery. This shift is a result of China’s 
reexamination of its ‘strategic frontiers.’83 “The concept of three ‘island chains’ grew out 
of the former CMC Vice-Chairman Admiral Liu Huaqing’s instructions to the PLA Navy 
(PLAN) to establish a long-term development plan. Establishing a blue-water presence in 
the first island chain, which runs from Japan past Taiwan to the Philippines, was to be 
attained by 2010.”84 Taiwan, naturally, would be the most prized position of the first 
island chain; it would allow China’s navy the ability to springboard into the next island 
chain, thus potentially countering any plans for a U.S. missile shield and intervention in a 
Taiwan reunification effort.  
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Additionally, China continues to demonstrate its maritime ambitions by legal 
measures. In 1996, China signed and ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS). Bernard Cole states that China’s ratification of UNCLOS 
delineates four things: China’s territory is measured 12 nautical miles (nm) from its 
coastline; extended a contiguous zone out to 24 nm (which a state does not control but 
may exercise control if necessary); create a 200 nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ); and, 
lastly, create a 350 nm continental shelf, over which a state might exercise limited 
sovereignty.85 However, four years before China became a signatory to UNCLOS, it laid 
claim to the maritime area of the South China Sea, including the island of Taiwan, under 
the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The 1996 ratification of 
UNCLOS cemented the Chinese perception that its 1992 island claims were legitimate. 
Therefore, in 2004, there was a sense of urgency as Taiwan independence appeared to be 
moving faster than before, and this resulted in the 2005 Anti-Secession Law.86 Not being 
able to forcefully back its territorial claims, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
legitimacy now weighs on the ability to create a situation that can effectively challenge 
the United States military intervention in a Taiwan Strait contingency.   
China’s position concerning it maritime borders could also be viewed as merging 
with its space borders. “Justifying China’s actions in international law and establishing 
positions in domestic law are increasingly important for the PLA as its strategists and 
planners think about space warfare.”87 China’s military planners are examining its 
sovereignty in space as projected above its territorial claims.88 “There is a debate in 
China focused on concern about the freedom of other nations to undertake military 
activities in-or over sovereignty from that normally accepted in international law and 
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practice.”89 Chinese legal scholar Ren Xiaofeng views space overflight as battlefield 
preparation; he states, “Freedom of navigation and overflight does not include the 
freedom to conduct military and reconnaissance activities.”90 China is well aware that the 
United States, and namely the U.S. Navy, is the largest customer of space assets.91 The 
PLA’s Academy of Military Science has identified that 90% United States Navy 
communication rely on satellites. Therefore, this legal discussion concerning space 
overflight is aimed directly at legally justifying forceful means to strike the United 
States’ ability to project its power into the region.92  
Testifying before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on 
February 27, 2008, Peter Dutton, stated that China is seeking to change the traditional 
maritime rights above its EEZ.93 “China’s efforts to alter the balance of maritime rights 
are part of its overall anti-access strategy, and could have an impact on the perceived 
legitimacy of U.S. operations in the region, especially in a time of crisis,” stated 
Dutton.94  
In summary, geographical factors have aided in shaping Chinese perceptions that 
creating an ASAT weapon could allow it to create an offense dominant position. Center 
to this perception is China’s reunification ambitions with Taiwan. Taiwan’s ongoing 
independence remains a symbol of Chinese failure to repel what it sees as foreign 
intervention in its internal affairs. As a result, China has implemented maritime claims 
backed by legal measures, and it is possible that it might decide to ban space overflight in 
a time of conflict. These measures constitute a form of offense dominance because China 
appears to be legally preparing itself for war, and the development of the ASAT weapon 
could only make these legal actions more credible. Most likely, these geographical 
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factors have influenced China’s decision to create the means to end foreign interference. 
These legal measures and the ASAT weapon itself are a vast undertaking that 
complement one other, and is an example of China’s sense of offense dominance.  
4. China’s Military Factors of Offense Dominance  
China’s military modernization is one of the most important examples of China’s 
sense of offense dominance and it also lends support that it harbors false optimism. While 
the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful China much uncertainty surrounds its 
expanding military power and how it might be used.95 A combination of four events have 
shaped China’s military modernization and its evolving military doctrine that lead to the 
its perception of offense dominance: the first U.S. led Gulf War, the 1996 Taiwan Crisis, 
the 1999 Kosovo War and the ongoing U.S. led War on Terror.96  
“The Gulf War stimulated deep introspection and analysis in the PLA about the 
nature of contemporary warfare and the reforms necessary to ready the Chinese armed 
forces to wage it.”97 The Chinese studies of the first Gulf War concluded that future 
warfare will be limited geographically and of short duration consisting primarily of high 
technology.98 The PLA noted the ability of the United States to control the initiative 
though the use of space assets.99 Not only has China thought to have recognized the 
strengths of the United States military operations during the first Gulf War, it is thought 
to have recognized its potential weakness in space.100 The PLA’s most important lesson 
of the Gulf War focused on weaponry, and PLA writings concerning doctrine started to 
stress the importance of weapons and technologies.101 This point is an important element 
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in this discussion that the Chinese perceive the ASAT weapon as being able to create a 
situation of offense dominance. The ASAT weapon appears to be the Chinese solution to 
what the Chinese believe will give them the ability to fight a high tech war in the future. 
For this reason it is critical to understand that Chinese perception of offense dominance is 
reinforced by the actual development of the weapon. It appears there has been a 
considerable investment into this weapon, and now that they possess it, mostly likely, 
they feel that they can create a temporal shift in the military balance of power. 
Furthermore, this point combined with Jiang Zemin’s promises to the PLA that it would 
be afforded the resources to counter the U.S. ability to interfere in a Taiwan contingency 
demonstrates that China harbors an offense dominance perception because it now had 
developed this capability.     
Secondly, the 1996 Taiwan Crisis caused further implications for China’s defense 
modernization. The United States dispatched two carriers, Independence and Nimitz, after 
the PLA’s Second Artillery began to practice live-fire exercises as a means of showing its 
growing impatience with Taiwan and the U.S. stance concerning its One-China Policy. 
According to Robert Ross, the crisis was the turning point in U.S.-China relations.102 The 
ability of the United States to respond to the crisis highlighted China’s military weakness 
compared to the capability of the U.S. Navy to maintain a presence in the area without a 
challenge.103 Still focusing on lessons it had learned from its study of the first Gulf War, 
the Taiwan Crisis provided increased momentum for the PLA’s military 
modernization.104 “Since then many elements of the PLA planning, training, and 
procurement have become contingency-driven, dominated by the specter of a military 
conflict with the United States over Taiwan.”105  
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Building upon what it had already observed during the first Gulf War and the 
1996 Taiwan Crisis, China again evaluated the 1999 Kosovo War and drew lessons that 
applied to its anti-access strategy. Three lessons drawn were: war with the United States 
was unavoidable; defense measures to employ against the United States can be effective; 
and the U.S. military has strategic weaknesses.  
“The Yugoslav war clearly created a sense of urgency on China’s military and 
strategic circles, with many warning that previous Chinese predictions that “peace and 
development” were the dominant trends of the times had been wrong, and that war with 
the United States was imminent.”106 The accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade most likely added to this perception.107 Chinese observers not only 
perceived that war with the United States was unavoidable, it also concluded that the U.S. 
led action was declared a multilateral and justified under the banner of a humanitarian 
intervention.108 The Chinese leadership perceived that the Clinton Doctrine would be the 
means through which the United States would intervene into its internal affairs beyond 
Taiwan to include places such as Tibet and Xingjiang.109  
Second, although Chinese analysts were impressed with the U.S. led air 
campaign, observers from the Academy of Military Sciences noted the success of the 
Serbian force’s ability to hide air defenses.110 As a result, the Yugoslav War allowed the 
PLA to conclude that it should implement a new program of “three attacks and three 
defenses.”111 While the three attacks are focused on countering military hardware, the 
three defenses are defending against enemy reconnaissance and surveillance, enemy 
precision strikes and the use of electronic interference.112 Most likely, it was at this 
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moment that Michael Pillsbury noted that Chinese strategists started to emphasize the use 
of “Assassin’s Mace.”113 China’s test of an ASAT weapon and Jiang Zemin’s promise to 
the PLA that it will have the means available to confront the United States is relevant to 
the adoption of the “three attacks and three defenses.” More than likely this was the point 
at which China formed the idea that it could develop a weapon capable of creating a 
situation of offense dominance.  
Lastly, observes Roger Cliff, the Chinese study of the Kosovo War concluded that 
the U.S. military had many key strategic weaknesses.114 These perceived weaknesses are 
that the U.S. Military cannot successful fight more than one war at the same time due to 
limited resources; the inability to allow its military to intervene in a timely manner due to 
patrician politics; anti-war concerns after the United States was to suffer casualties; and, 
lastly, the United States would be unable to execute its successful military missions if it 
were not for the reliance on its allies.115 The Kosovo War had another important impacts 
on the Chinese perceptions concerning U.S. military power. “The conflict over Kosovo 
convinced the PLA that it must use short-term solutions while modernizing. The goal of 
catching up with America in IW in the next two decades is not one filled with optimism, 
especially after watching the advanced performance of NATO weaponry.”116 From the 
Chinese point of view, the 1999 military action in Kosovo helped to speed up PLA 
modernization by enhancing the move from mechanized to forces to informational 
forces.117 In 2003, “former Chairman Jiang Zemin noted that no matter what changes 
occur in the form of warfare, even IW, People’s War remains China’s magic key to beat 
an enemy.”118 Although the original concept of the Peoples War was defensive in nature, 
the adoption of the IW concept to include the utility of an ASAT weapons could support 
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the point that Chinese warfare, although, high tech will still involve its asymmetric 
elements. In the Chinese view, the ASAT weapon is the means to leverage the balance of 
power and using it could create a shift in the offense dominance even though China’s 
military modernization may never be on equal terms of the United States.   
More recently, the War on Terror has afforded the Chinese military analysts 
further observations.119 Chinese media watches and reports what is being written in the 
United States concerning military strength and the ongoing war.120 One such report states 
that the U.S. Army’s presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has over extended the force and 
wonders how much longer it can continue.121 Certainly, these U.S. generated reports gain 
the attention of Chinese military leadership and further lead them to the conclusion that 
the U.S. does have a strategic weakness. Larry Wortzel states that Chinese studies of Iraq 
and Afghanistan have so far led them to believe that the dependence on space assets 
continues to be a U.S. vulnerability and unchecked remote sensing will allow the United 
States to use reconnaissance to its advantage.122  
China’s military modernization has been shaped by its reaction to U.S. military 
power demonstrated during the First Gulf War, the 1996 Taiwan Crisis, Kosovo War and 
the ongoing War on Terror. Most important, China’s 1999 adoption of the “three attacks 
and three defenses” have helped shape the perception that building weapons such as the 
ASAT weapon, it could use it to create a shift in the balance of power by targeting what it 
perceives at the U.S. reliance on space (discussed below). Building upon these points, it 
is important also to note that China’s military expenditures also contribute to its sense of 
offense dominance; however, it also, according to Van Evera, is an element of false 
optimism.  
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a. Chinese Defense Spending  
Drawing from the U.S. Defense Department’s Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China 2008 to discuss China’s defense spending, this most recent 
report states, “China continues to promulgate incomplete defense expenditure figures, 
and engage in actions that appear inconsistent with its declaratory polices.”123 Although 
China has settled most of its land border disputes, it has increased its military spending 
since 1996 drastically, and its declared policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan 
appears to be a far second to its military option which is reflected in the amount of money 
its has invested in its military. See Figure 2 for this constant increase in military 
expenditures.  
These increases are above the inflation experienced between the years 
1988 to 1997.124 In fact, the defense budget continues to outpace the overall growth of 
the economy.125  China is committed to investing in its military at the expense of not 
investing this revenue in other areas; it appears that it is bent on creating a force that is 
capable of confronting a sizable force beyond its neighbors.   
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Figure 2.   Defense Expenditures of the PRC: 1996-2007126  
With regards to its military modernization expenditures, Mark Stokes 
stated in 1999, that the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) is the most important facet 
of China’s military modernization.127 CASC is responsible for the development of 
technologies such as the ASAT weapon; however, China’s official budget does not 
include research and development such as the development of its space weapons.128 The 
cost of building ASATs could be an “economically sound decision.”129 Using 2005 data, 
John-Johnson Freese estimates that China spends roughly $1.4 billion to $2.2 billion on 
its entire space program, which includes CASC.130 The value gained from investing in 
ASAT could imply that China intends to build more ASAT weapons.   
                                                 
126 United States Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2008, 32.  
127 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, 6.  
128 United States Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, 31.  
129 Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, 122.  
130 Marcia S. Smith, “China’s Space Program: An Overview,” CRS Report to Congress #RS21641 
(2006): 4, http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/ (accessed June 7, 2007).  
  35
The Chinese military budget is relevant because not only does it provide an example of 
increased military spending beyond the current threat environment, it is also one of the 
first overt examples that China harbors false optimism. China’s officially reported 
military expenditures appears to be far from an accurate, so what is it actually spending 
on its military is unknown.131 China’s lack of transparency concerning its military 
spending and its undisclosed military doctrine leads to an elevated level of uncertainty, as 
pointed out in the most recent report on the military power of the PRC.132 This matter of 
secrecy concerning China’s military budget is made more serious by the China’s 
development of an ASAT weapon. Not disclosing its military spending while also 
discussing the best way to defeat the United States by attacking space assets are all 
examples that China carries a sense of false optimism. 
b. Chinese Doctrine  
One of the most important elements of the Chinese’s offense dominance 
mentality is the evaluation of its secretive military doctrine. The evaluation of Chinese 
military doctrine provided below is the last element supporting that the position that 
China perceives the ASAT weapon as being able to create a situation of offense 
dominance. It also suggests that China harbors a since of false optimisms. Chinese 
doctrine is centered upon the theory that a first strike on space systems is the key to 
Chinese victory. Chinese doctrine, therefore, is the smoking gun to the claim that it 
harbors an offense dominate position and that its emphasis on using the first move 
advantage to create a temporal shift in the balance of power points to the possibility that 
it harbors false optimism.   
In the year that China was in the midst of studying the effects of the U.S. 
led Gulf War (1995), Steven Lambakis authored an article featured in Orbis entitled, 
“Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond.”133 In this article, Lambakis made three 
observations concerning the use of space during the First Gulf War: the United States 
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information systems in space were unchallenged; space control will be as important as 
sea control; and, lastly, in 1994, the U.S. Naval War College conducted a war game that 
simulated Chinese attacks on naval space assets that caused the loss of the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet.134 It is unknown to the author if Chinese military students of the first Gulf War 
received Lambakis’ article; however, Lambakis did state the obvious: space was 
becoming more important in the United States’ ability to conduct modern warfare. 
Months later, in December 1995, the Chinese leadership adopted the “Two 
Transformation” based on its assessment of the Gulf War.135 This transformation focused 
on two things: being able to fulfill the 1993 instructions that call for the ability to fight a 
local war under high-tech conditions; and, second, creating an army based on quality.136  
Starting in 1993, the CMC issued a set of instructions to the PLA called 
“Military Strategic Guidelines.”137 David Finkelstein states, as explained by the PLA’s 
National Defense University, “The military strategic guidelines are the fundamental 
military policies of the party and the nation. They are the overall principles for planning 
and guiding the development and utilization of the armed forces.’”138 Simply put, this is 
the doctrinal aspect of China’s military modernization. Since the Military Strategic 
Guidelines have been issued, they have remained the driving force under which China 
has sought to modernize its military for the past 15 years.139 On the other hand, and 
similar to these 1993 strategic guidelines, are the ideas of “Active Defense.” The two 
ideas go hand-in-hand. PLA Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu says that the Chinese military 
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believes that future wars will be a combination of these two concepts.140 While “Military 
Strategic Guidelines,” are instructions to modernize the PLA into a modern force of the 
21st century, “Active Defense” has evolved from the Mao Zedong military thought of 
asymmetric warfare but retains the core element of fighting a stronger force with less. 
The modern version of China’s Active Defense as described by David Finkelstein 
follows:  
• Overall, our military strategy is defensive. We attack only after being 
attacked. However, our operations are offensive.  
• Our counteroffensive will not be limited by space and time.  
• We will not put boundaries on the limits of our offensives.  
• We will wait for the time and conditions that favor our forces when we do 
initiate offensive operations.  
• We will focus on the opposing force’s weakness.  
• We will use our own forces to eliminate the enemy’s force.  
• Offensive operations against the enemy and defensive operations for our 
own force protection will be conducted simultaneously. 
• We will maximize our advantage against the opposing force.141 
“In short, the PLA’s attention is now doctrinally fixed on being able to 
prosecute short campaigns inflicting shock and paralysis to level the technological 
playing field at the inception of hostilities by concentrating PLA’s best capabilities 
against the enemy’s most important assets.”142 As Mao Zedong would say, “You fight 
your way, and we’ll fight our way.”143 It appears that Chinese military doctrine has 
evolved from its people’s war concept to its current manifestation of being able to fight 
by employing highly technical weapons in an offensive manner. The ASAT weapon was 
developed for this reason and this reason alone. Instead of drawing the enemy deep into 
interior lines, the ASAT weapon will take advantage of U.S. space assets that pass 
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overhead and unprotected. The offensive use of the ASAT weapon, in theory, permits 
China to create a devastating first move advantage. Additional utility could be gained 
from using the ASAT weapon in an offensive manner, once used, the Chinese perceive 
that it will further assist in defensive position after an adversary’s space situational 
awareness has been degraded. China views the possession of ASAT weapons certainly 
has a place in the “Two Transformation” concept by inflicting a “shock and paralysis.”      
Furthermore, the 9th Five-Year Plan, 1996-1999, the CMC, under Jiang 
Zemin’s guidance, issued its guidelines for military operations and tactical level of war 
called the “New Generation Operations Regulations.”144 Although this did not change 
Chinese strategy, it did cut across every facet of the PLA.145 This newly issued doctrine 
drew on the lessons not only from the First Gulf War, the 1996 Taiwan Crisis and 
Kosovo but also the shift in perception of the changing security environment. The “New 
Generation Operation Regulations is the campaign level guidance of how the PLA will 
employ its military force.”146 In 2003, these thoughts on army building were “elevated” 
to the hierarchy of thought of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.147 These publications are 
not made public, so whatever doubt the West carries concerning China’s military doctrine 
is centered on not knowing how China plans to use its military force. This also furthers 
the case for Chinese false optimism because China hides its military doctrine and feels 
that it needs to conceal its intentions. The need to keep its doctrine secret is most likely a 
result of its insistence that the PLA should seize control of the battlefield before the 
outbreak of hostilities.   
“In January 2007 (around the time of the ASAT test), the PLA General 
Staff Department (GSD) released its yearly guidance on military training. For the first 
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time the training is focused on training under ‘informationized’ conditions.”148 
Therefore, it appears that the PLA’s effort to modernize has moved past the stage of 
adopting its doctrine and now is focused on training its troops for combat. Furthermore, it 
might suggest that China has fully adopted the mentality that it can use the ASAT to 
create a shift in the strategic balance. It is possible that the ASAT test was part of this 
new training environment. Some of these military writings will be examined below, and 
it serves as the strongest support for the Chinese perception of ASAT weapon as being 
able to level the playing field in favor of China.  
c. Chinese Military Thought 
Although official Chinese military doctrine is not open to the outside, a 
number of Chinese military authors have written a great deal concerning military 
modernization that has been made available to an English only audience. Additionally, a 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) report has concluded that PLA authored 
and published material is subject to filtering by the General Political Department 
(GPD).149 If Chinese military authors have produced material from one of China’s 
leading military education centers, then most likely, it reflects guidance issued during the 
New Generation Operation Regulations. Additionally, these PLA authored articles offer 
means for its officers to suggest warfare methods to China’s leadership.150 What was 
written between the 1996-1999 time frame is important to the study of China’s doctrine 
because it more than likely represents some aspects of Chinese thoughts on war fighting 
in informationalized conditions that have been officially adopted as part of the military 
doctrine.151  
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d. Chinese Thought on Information Warfare 
Senior Colonel Wang Baocun and Li Fei, members of the Academy of 
Military Sciences, define information warfare as being “combat aimed at seizing the 
battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential combat force; the seizure, control, 
and use of information as its main substance; all sorts of information weaponry and 
systems as its major means.”152 Furthermore, the authors state there are five major 
elements of information warfare that include the primary element of destroying enemy 
information centers.153 As far as attacking these targets, Wang and Li state:  
Information offense means attacking enemy information systems. Its aims 
are: destroying or jamming enemy information sources, to undermine or 
weaken enemy C&C (command and control) capability, and cutting off 
the enemy’s whole operational system. The key targets of information 
offense are the enemy’s combat command, control and coordination, 
intelligence, and global information systems. A successful information 
offensive requires three prerequisites: 1) the capability to understand the 
enemy’s information systems, and the establishment of a corresponding 
database system; 2) diverse and effective means of attack; and 3) capacity 
to make battle damage assessment [BDA] of attacked targets.154  
Other Chinese authors such as Major General Wang Pufeng, former 
director of the Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, suggest that the 
Chinese have recognized that information warfare will control the outcome of future 
wars.155 Firepower and information are linked, states Wang.156 “There is a question of 
how to use weakness to defeat strength and how to conduct war against weak enemies in 
order to use information superiority to achieve greater victories at a smaller cost.”157 In 
order to face an enemy that holds a superior position, Wang suggests that the PLA must 
emphasize using inferior methods to achieve victory, ‘using the inferior to overcome the 
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superior.’158 Being able to create the situation of defeating the superior with inferior 
military power, Wang recommends that the most important system is the tactical guided 
missile attack that could conceal and strengthen survival capacity to provide an effective 
threat.159 Stating his principles of firm control of the battlefield, Wang states:  
When China’s enemies mainly use their air force and navies to conduct 
strategic information warfare, China will be in the strategic position of 
engaging in defensive warfare along interior lines. The progress and 
outcome of the war will be determined by the state of China’s advance 
preparations and defense situation during the war. In defensive warfare, 
China should still thoroughly implement an active defensive strategy. In 
addition to hiding and concealing forces, in combat, especially during key 
phases in key areas, we must engage even more actively in air defense 
warfare and intercept and attack enemy weapons as they arrive in surprise 
attack.160  
Another author, Chang Mengxiong, member of the Committee of Science, 
Technology and Industry of the Systems Engineering Institute, states, “Conversely, if one 
side can effectively weaken the information capability of the other side, even if its 
capability on other ways is less, the other side will dare not take any ill considered action. 
These two situations constitute ‘information dominance.’ It can prevent war from 
breaking out.”161 Chang summarizes his overall thought on information warfare by 
stating, “Information warfare will be the most complex type of warfare in the 21st 
century, and it will decide who will win and who will lose the war.”162   
In summary, these authors stress the concept of defeating the superior with 
the inferior by being able to create a first strike scenario against enemy information hubs. 
This certainly, supports the development of ASAT weapons as a means to confront the 
United States by using an offensive posture.  These authors all appear to support that 
China will have the ability to create a shift in the strategic balance once they have the 
weapons able to achieve these measures.  
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People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) Captain Shen Zhongchang, 
PLAN Lieutenant Commander Zhang Haiyin and Lieutenant Zhou Xingheng, officers at 
the Naval Research Institute in Beijing state that the use of high tech arms will make 
direct attacks on naval battlefields possible from outer space.163 “By the next century, as 
high-tech space technology develops, the development of space-based weapons systems 
will be bound to make ‘mastery of outer space’ prerequisites for naval victory, with outer 
space becoming the new commanding elevation for naval combat.”164 These three 
authors continue by observing that future naval conflicts will break out much faster than 
previous wars and suddenness will play a decisive factor in winning these battles.165 Due 
to this sudden outbreak, it is important that forces quickly obtain a favorable battlefield 
stance, first strikes.166   
The same three authors continue their approach to naval warfare in the 21st 
century in a follow on article featured in the 1996 edition of China Military Science.167 
This article emphasizes more attacks on C4ISR systems than the previous article. Noting 
that the United States has also noted that its communication networks in space could be 
easily targeted by potential enemies, the three authors state, “In future naval war, 
destroying the opponent’s information network will have significance in controlling 
information and taking the initiative in the war.”168 Shen Zhongchang, et al., state that in 
information war the effectiveness of naval vessels is largely dependent on its soft systems 
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these are removed, these craft are unable to perform their missions.169 Additionally, they 
state, “Missiles are the main weapon not only for modern sea war but also for future sea 
information war.”170  
In summary, Chinese writings on the future warfare were examined; these 
writings were written during the time period that is thought to have influenced China’s 
current military doctrine. China’s military doctrine has been tailored to provide the 
guidance for its military modernization intended to fight wars under conditions of 
informationization, and striking at an enemy’s center of gravity as a means of defeating a 
superior military force. China believes that space is the critical force enabler that allows 
powerful countries to exploit the situation of war from the outbreak. Being able to 
impede this strategic frontier before the United States, China concludes, will allow it to 
create a situation that would render space dependent militaries from being able to project 
its power. These writings strongly suggest that China is under the impression that 
possessing this capability is a necessity for fighting and winning against a more powerful 
country, the United States. These writing further suggest that these weapons shall be the 
primary means to create a shift in the strategic balance of power. Weapons such an ASAT 
hold significant implications towards China’s ability to conduct a war under condition of 
informationization. Now that China has tested the weapon, it appears it assumes that it 
can be use it to defeat the superior with the inferior. Most likely, China maintains a sense 
of offense dominance. Without outside knowledge of Chinese military doctrine and the 
continued emphasis on secrecy lends support for the claim that China harbors false 
optimism. The continued emphasis on gaining the first strike to achieve this is central to 
the argument that China harbors an offense dominate mentality.   
This offense dominant position has resulted in the perception that it has 
the means necessary to confront the U.S. power. Factors such as the military technology, 
geographical factors, social structures of security and the military organization of China 
have all contributed to a need for offensive options, but China’s insistence on secrecy and 
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the need to undertake a first strike against space assets suggests that it may also harbor 
false optimism. For this reason, China’s ASAT test is worthy of mention. After years of 
concluding that it can weaken the United States by attacking its space assets, it has now 
successfully tested the weapon. As mentioned above, false optimism is one of the leading 
causes of war. In the case of China, its offense dominant perspective has continued after 
the successful ASAT test.     
D. IMPLICATIONS OF OFFENSE DOMINANCE AFTER THE ASAT TEST  
1. Promotions within China’s Military Industrial Complex  
Months following the test, Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber suggested in a Foreign 
Affairs article that some observers of China misunderstood the recent Chinese ASAT 
demonstration.171 They state, “Beijing’s right hand may not have known what its left 
hand was doing.”172 They suggest that the PLA’s Second Artillery executed the ASAT 
test without consulting the PRC leadership.173 However, this seems unlikely for a couple 
of reasons. First, in light of China’s ongoing campaign to quell any challenge to its 
leadership, it seems more likely that CCP/CMC would not allow its military and defense 
industry to conduct an ASAT test without its knowledge, especially one that caused an 
international backlash over the amount of debris created by the test. Second, it appears 
less likely China’s leadership would have not been aware of the ASAT test due to the 
failures of the previously ASAT tests. Certainly, the CMC would be interested in 
knowing that its investment in ASAT technology was finally coming to fruition, 
especially given all the attention to the development of ASAT technology and the 
military writings directed toward the development of creating weapons capable of 
defeating the superior with the inferior. It appears that the ASAT weapon is a pinnacle 
weapon in China’s military modernization and not reporting its test is difficult to accept 
given the conditions under which the weapon was developed.   
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Furthermore, instead of removing the leadership responsible for the January 2007 
ASAT test from their positions’, several people in the defense industry were promoted. In 
July 2008, the PRC moved General Chen Bingde from the position of head of General 
Armaments Department (GAD), which includes its space weapon development, to Chief 
of the General Staff where he will have authority over all of China’s 2.3 million-member 
military.174 General Chen held a number of positions in the Nanjing Military Region 
prior to assuming the role as Chief of Staff, mainly planning for preparations for a 
conflict with Taiwan.175 General Chen is also a member of the CMC. Therefore, this 
promotion could been seen as China’s leadership wanting to have some expertise close to 
the decision making circle, especially one with knowledge of its ASAT capabilities.  
Other promotions followed the wake of the successful ASAT test. Kevin Pollpeter 
has referred to the promotion of five defense industry members as the “rise of the space 
gang.”176 In August 2007, space professionals were appointed to top positions in China’s 
space weapon development bureaucracy.177 These include: Zang Qingwie’s promotion 
from general manager of China Aerospace Science and Technology (CASC) to the head 
position of China’s Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National 
Defense (COSTIND).178 In addition to Zang’s promotion, four of the eight top positions 
at GAD also point out that these appointments indicate that these people will continue to 
influence the decision making process of the military industrial complex.179 More than 
likely, these promotions demonstrate the leadership’s satisfaction with the ASAT weapon 
test and the desire to push its military modernization goals.  
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2. Status of Taiwan after the ASAT Test  
After the ASAT test, China continues to maintain secret military intentions. 
Cross-strait tensions also remain, but now China possess a weapon that it has concluded 
will allow it to take advantage of a U.S. military weakness. Senior Chinese government 
and party officials stated before the party congress that China would fashion a new policy 
to deal with the Taiwan.180 Instead of a more forceful move such as firing missiles, as it 
did in 1996, Chinese President Hu Jintao, stated that he was willing to explore peaceful 
means to reunify Taiwan during the 17th Party Congress in October 2007.181 However, 
Taiwanese President, Chen Sui-bian, called Hu’s offer a treaty of surrender of the 
Taiwanese people, rejected the proposal.182 There is evidence that China has continued to 
grow more impatient with Taiwan after January 11, 2007. Jianwei Wang, states the recent 
Taiwanese attempt to gain access to the United Nations via a name change has caused, 
“growing consensus among the leadership and elite that in the contexts of the Anti-
Succession Law, Beijing has no other choice than to take some action including “non-
peaceful means.”183 It is very possible that China perceives itself as being able to create a 
situation that will allow it to use force successfully without having to confront the total 
military capability of the United States. The ASAT test has most likely added to this 
sense of offense dominance.  
Taiwan has announced that it would once again seek UN membership in July 
2008.184 
3.  The U.S. ASAT Test and China’s Military Exercises  
When the United States intercepted its errant satellite, USA-193, on February 21, 
2008, China’s Foreign Ministry Liu Jiachao requested that the United States provide the 
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data from the ASAT launch according to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.185 A Center for 
Defense Information article observes that China, on the other hand, was not compliant 
with the 1967 treaty when it conducted its ASAT test because it was suppose to notify 
other signatures that it intended to conduct a test that could harm space objects.186 
Additionally, on February 12, 2008 China and Russia jointly submitted to the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of 
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects 
(PPWT).187  
On March 4, 2007, Beijing announced a 17.8% increase, and was later revised by 
the state council to 19.47%, or $45.99 billion.188 If China aims at producing more ASAT 
weapons, certainly is a relevant topic worth close monitoring. Based on its perception of 
offense dominance, it appears that China will further invest in this weapon. 
One of the last elements supporting the claims that China maintains an offensive 
dominant position with regard to its ASAT weapon is recent PLA exercise. According to 
a analysis after the ASAT test, Chinese open sources have reported that PLA Second 
Artillery are conducting exercises aimed at concealing movement from American 
reconnaissance satellites.189 This appears to be part of the new training environment that 
was adopted last year but also part of the “three defenses.” China’s sense of offense 
dominance is perpetuated in its adoption of training based on the combat environment 
and in the sense that it is able to create a shift in the strategic balance of power. The 
emphasis of hiding artillery forces, mobile launchers, from reconnaissance has huge 
implications for being able to conduct a successful attack against U.S. naval surface 
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forces. Once China feels that it can hide from U.S. reconnaissance satellites it will 
become even more convinced that it can create a situation of offense dominance. The risk 
of war in now higher due to the Chinese perception that it can create a shift in the balance 
of power between it and the United States.         
E. OFFENSE DOMINANCE – CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter examined the Chinese perspective of offense dominance through the 
lens of Stephen Van Evera’s Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War Theory. The 
factors shaping the Chinese perception of offense dominance were explored through the 
aggregate factors offense dominance such as military technology, geographical factors, 
social structures and lastly the military factors. In each case, every factor runs counter to 
the position of the United States. The ASAT weapon itself is an advanced weapon that 
could strike at vital U.S. space assets, and serves as a marked improvement in the ability 
to destroy satellites in low earth orbit. The Chinese perception of reunification with 
Taiwan appears to be in opposition to the United States interests. The geographical 
ambitions of China and its continued legislation to reunite it with Taiwan are all 
examples that development of the ASAT weapon could now be used to achieve a position 
of being able to confront the United States. The military modernization of China and the 
doctrine all imply that is preparing to confront the United States. One of the important 
factors leading China to develop the ASAT weapon was its evaluation of the Kosovo 
War. After its study of the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo, China adopted the “three 
attacks and three defenses.” It appears that this has greatly influenced China’s sense of 
offense dominance by leading it to believe that it can create a shift in the strategic balance 
by conducting a first strike against U.S. space assets.  
China harbors an offensive dominant position concerning the potential use of its 
ASAT weapon. As a result of China’s emphasis on maintaining a level of secrecy that is 
closely tied to its doctrinal need to strike U.S. space assets first, it is possible that it also 
has incorrectly assessed in potential victory and maintains false optimism.  Stephen Van 
Evera points out that false optimism is the cause of many wars. Therefore, it is quite  
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reasonable to assume that the next time U.S. naval forces are operating near China’s 
periphery due to heightened tensions between China and Taiwan, U.S. space assets could 
be attacked due to the perception that it would give China the ability to create a situation 
of offense dominance.    
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III.  FALSE OPTIMISM EXAMINED  
A.  REALITY CHECK: INTRODUCTION 
China appears to have concluded that it cannot militarily confront the United 
States in a Taiwan contingency unless it takes advantage of the first move that is 
designed to creating a shift in its offensive capabilities. Some argue that China’s strategy 
would be aimed at creating a naval blockade to keep the U.S. at a distance. As evidenced 
in the previous chapter, China might use its ASAT weapon as a means of creating this 
shift. Now that China possesses the weapon, how effective could the ASAT weapon be in 
repelling the U.S. naval surface forces from its coast? What effect would it have on the 
operational capabilities of U.S. naval surface forces?  
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that China would find it nearly impossible to 
create a shift in the balance of forces between itself and the United States by attacking its 
space assets, thus clarifying any misunderstanding resulting from China’s false optimism. 
The chapter will begin by discussing the U.S. Navy’s needs in space that enable it fulfill 
its maritime strategy. Then it will look at the most likely attack on U.S. space assets in 
low earth orbit. After an examination of China’s possibilities of being able to shoot down 
U.S. space reconnaissance assets, it will conclude that such an attack would be extremely 
difficult to accomplish; and, even if it where to become a reality, U.S. civil space assets 
could be used as a reserve imagery source. Next, the risk to GPS satellites will be 
examined. This will demonstrate there appears to be an evolving threat; but if U.S. 
reconnaissance satellites remain intact China will not be able to destroy much needed 
GPS satellites. Lastly, the risk to communication satellites will be evaluated. It will also 
demonstrate that China does not appear to posses the capability to attack all 
communication satellites that could potentially be used by the United States military, thus 
not possessing a risk. The United States military could continue to provide power 
projection after an attack on its satellites.   
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B.  THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND SPACE SUPPORT 
A U.S. Navy response to a Taiwan Strait crisis will be founded upon the six core 
pillars of the nation’s maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy of the 21st Century 
Seapower. These six pillars of the U.S. maritime strategy are identified as the following: 
forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security and 
humanitarian assistance/disaster response.190 These operations will not be hindered by 
anti-access strategies.191 Certainly, U.S. space assets will contribute U.S. maritime 
opposition to anti-access measures, as pointed out earlier; the United States Navy is the 
largest user of space. The maritime strategy of the United States links the over-arching 
concepts of Sea Power 21 and its tenets: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing and 
FORCEnet.192 
C.  UNITED STATES SPACE ASSETS AND THE NAVY’S NEED  
Space Security 2007 recognizes that the United States military maintains eight 
reconnaissance satellites in earth’s lower orbit along with other force enhancing elements 
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Figure 3.   Key U.S. Military Space Assets.193  
                                                 
193 Space Security (2007): 134.  
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Naval operations depend on the following satellites to perform its missions: 
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, Communications, Position/Navigation/Timing 
(PNT), Space Control, Ballistic Missile Warning/Defense and Metrological and 
Oceanographic (METOC).194 In terms of the overall strategic framework of Sea Power 
21, a 2005 study on the current and future needs of the Navy’s space assets has identified 
the U.S. Navy’s space requirements as shown in Figure 4.     
 
 
Figure 4.   Sea Power 21 Space Mission Areas 195 
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The Navy’s primary needs in space can be summarized as the following areas: 
ocean and littoral surveillance, secure communications, real time measurements 
(GPS).196 
D.  ATTACKS ON SPACE ASSETS 
1.  Attacks on Low Earth Orbit Space Assets  
According to all open sources, China simply cannot create a devastating first 
strike against U.S. low earth orbit assets. A worst-case scenario space attack, according to 
Geoffrey Forden’s evaluation, China could only destroy a total of nine U.S. satellites, and 
it would have to be done simultaneously against LEO assets.197 Destroying nine satellites 
in a quick and decisive manner would involve months of planning.198 Open source 
material that suggest that China would find it difficult to execute a space attack of this 
size covertly; and if a reality, it would only limit, not prevent the U.S. Navy from 
executing its strike and defense missions. China would have to preposition its mobile 
launchers throughout China, two launchers site per satellite.199 How well China is able to 
maintain covertness in positioning its mobile launchers throughout China is questionable. 
China may assume that they can keep paired TELs hidden from intelligence satellites, but 
it has been reported new and improved reconnaissance satellites are able to distinguish 
between camouflage and vegetation in addition to detect thermal heat sources.200 
However, as mentioned in the last chapter, China is currently conducting exercising 
aimed at concealing its movements.201 However, this measure to dodge U.S. 
reconnaissance satellites may in fact be a result of China sense of false optimism.   
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China would need a contingency day for a worst-case scenario attack on nine 
satellites; therefore, a total of 36 TELs would be required to be propositioned throughout 
China.202 If China were to move its TELs throughout its territory in preparation for such 
a space attack, it seems likely that intelligence personnel would be likely to forecast the 
exact day of the coming attack due to the practicability of LEO assets and the position of 
the Chinese TELs.   
Furthermore, with most of the U.S. assets in LEO consisting of reconnaissance 
and NOSS satellites, according to Figure 4, it appears that the Navy surface forces could 
most likely loose electronic intelligence, reconnaissance, and Naval Ocean Surveillance 
Systems (NOSS). According the Space Mission Areas of Sea Power 21, a loss of NOSS 
assets appears not to affect Sea Basing, but could affect the mission areas of Sea Strike, 
Sea Shield and FORCEnet, but not totally disable these mission areas. However, NOSS 
satellites targeting might also prove difficult to target. NOSS satellites orbit grouped 
together in order triangulate vessels’ positions.203 Therefore, if China were to target 
NOSS satellites, then it could be assumed that its mobile launchers would be clustered 
together in groups of four to six.204 Being able to accomplish a surprise attack of this 
magnitude appears not to be possible, and China would also loose the element of surprise. 
It is possible that if the United States wished to remove the threat of a pre-emptive attack, 
it could exercise a first strike option upon the launchers.   
Additionally, China is limited in the amount of missiles needs to mount an attack 
of this scale. According to the figures presented in the last report on the military power of 
the PRC, China is assumed to possess between 60-80 CSS-5 missiles. See Figure 5.   
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Figure 5.   China’s Missile Forces205 
As noted earlier, the CSS-5 is believed to be the modified version of the DF-21 
missile. Most likely, China would have to deploy nearly three-fourths of its CSS-5 
launchers to create an effective first strike attack against U.S. space assets, and it could be 
further assumed that it would have deploy to nearly all the launchers to successfully 
create an attack under these conditions.   
Not only would China’s space attack preparation be difficult to hide from 
surveillance satellites, it appears that it could not create a gap in coverage thus creating a 
window of opportunity, allowing it to set in motion an anti-access strategy. The other Sea 
Power 21 mission area such as Sea Strike and Sea Shield appear to be supported by civil 
use satellites in the event of such losses to U.S. military LEO assets. The Navy Tactical 
Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) appears to supplement space assets lost 
after such an attack. The purpose of TENCAP is to exploit the current space assets of the 
nation and the information they provide to the Navy commander when needed.206 
“Bottom line of the program is to make the information form the national assets readily 
available to the commander.”207 The U.S. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) community has 
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used commercial imaging to as “gap-fillers.”208 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA) is the largest customer of GeoEye.209 GeoEye is the largest provider of 
commercial imaging; it provides imaging for Google.210 Early September 2008, GeoEye 
will launch the GeoEye-1 satellite. The imaging from this satellite will be the best 
commercial imaging on the market with a 0.41-meter resolution and a three-meter spatial 
accuracy.211 In addition to GeoEye, other commercial providers of satellite such as 
Digital Globe also provide imagery services to NGA.212 The French company Spot 
Image is also capable of providing imaging in the event of a loss of LEO space situational 
awareness. The use of commercial imaging satellites while coupled with the United 
States imaging satellites creates a fleet of satellites capable of fulfilling the mission of 
Sea Power 21. The number of dual-use satellites is more than China’s missiles and 
China’s space capabilities. The Union of Concerned Scientists has created a graph 
depicting the number of dual use satellites by country.  See Figure 6.  
                                                 
208 Michael J. Gething, “Imagery Intelligence: Boom Time for Image Intelligence as Digital 
Exploitation Burgeons,” Jane’s (2001), https://www.janes.com (accessed July 30, 2007). 
209 “Obrimage Receives Clearview Contract Award from NGA,” March 29, 2004 
http://geoeye.mediaroom.com/ (accessed August 18, 2008). 
210 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “GeoEye Signs Deal to Provide Imagery to Google,” Reuters, (August 28, 
2008), http://news.yahoo.com.  
211 John Craft, “Providing Mapping Capabilities, Spatial Resolution and Geolocation Ability: 
Geoeye’s Next Generation Imagery Satellites,” Geo Information, vol. 11, no. 4, (June 2008), 
http://fluidbook.microdesign.nl/geoinformatics/04-2008/, 18-19.  




Figure 6.   Estimates of Space Assets by Country213 
2.  Maneuvering of Satellites as the Precaution 
The maneuvering of satellites can also provide a measure of protection for U.S. 
reconnaissance satellites. In the 90 minutes required for a LEO satellite to orbit the earth, 
it passes over the equator at a spot roughly 2,500 kilometers (kms) west of the previous 
orbit track over the earth’s surface.214 This makes a LEO orbits path highly predictable. 
See Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.   Typical Orbit Ground Path of LEO satellite215  
Although the orbits of U.S. reconnaissance are highly predictable, it has been 
pointed out by Norman Freidman that earlier models of the U.S. Key Hole (KH) 
satellites, KH-11, carried a considerable amount of fuel for maneuvering for ASAT 
avoidance.216 KH-11’s predecessor, Crystal, is reported to have more fuel and possibly 
has the ability to be refueled by Space Shuttle crews.217 Fuel needed to maneuver to 
avoid Chinese targeting therefore would not appear to limit the United States’ ability to 
maneuver these satellites.   
As previously discussed, however, Chinese ASAT deployments may provide the 
warning necessary to maneuver LEO satellites to further complicate Chinese targeting 
abilities.  
Based on the number of Chinese TELs required for an attack on nine low earth 
orbit satellites and the option to maneuver LEO satellites, it could further complicate the 
targeting. Even after a worst-case scenario attack, the United States is left with more 
imaging assets that can be maneuvered, keeping Chinese TELs unable to predict the 
satellites track over ground. Therefore, reconnaissance satellite could continue to provide  
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imagery of Chinese force movements. It appears that maneuvering reconnaissance 
satellites in earth’s LEO could allow the U.S. to provide a counter measure against 
further ASAT attacks.  
Creating the worst-case scenario described above for U.S. LEO space assets 
would be difficult. With the required number of ASAT launchers needed to pull of a 
sudden attack of LEO assets, it seems highly unlikely that China would be able to 
position its launchers without being detected first. Due to the predictable track over 
ground of LEO satellites, intelligence professionals could predict the day of attack due to 
the disposition of Chinese TELs. Ocean surveillance satellites, NOSS, appear to be more 
difficult to target due to the fact that these satellite orbit in close proximity to another, so 
a potential attack affecting the United States naval surface ability to locate enemy ships at 
sea will most likely remain intact. Reconnaissance satellite are important for surface 
force operations but a potential loss can be replaced by other assets under Navy TENCAP 
and other commercial service programs capable of provided excellent detail for naval 
warfare. Additionally, if China decided to use its ASAT weapon, the U.S. could move its 
satellites, thus making it difficult for the Chinese to know in advance to disperse its 
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Table 1.   Major U.S. Civilian Satellites in Military Use218 
3.  Attacks upon Global Positioning Satellites 
Possible attacks on GPS satellites also appear to be a difficult task; however, if 
successful, it could be potentially one of the most destructive means to disable the surface 
force. GPS satellites, the space segment, operate in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), a range 
of approximately 12,000 miles. The ASAT weapon demonstrated in January 2007 most 
likely would not be able to achieve this distance, so one of China’s fixed launch sites 
would have to be used to reach MEO. Currently, China has three operational sites and 
one is under construction on Hainan Island.219 Geoffrey Forden’s study of this possible 
scenario concluded that China, using only its three operational launch facilities, could 
destroy a total of 16 GPS satellites.220 This could affect the operability of GPS over and 
around China’s periphery for periods of eight hours followed by periods of 16 hours of 
operability, and this pattern would continue until the U.S. was able to replace these lost 
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satellites.221 However, with a fourth launch site China could be able to take out more 
GPS satellites and create a larger time period without GPS coverage. In addition, 
according to the Sinodefense website, China is currently developing another ASAT 
weapon called the KT-2 and KT-2A that is capable of reaching geosynchronous orbit. 
An attack on GPS assets appears to potentially be most limiting to naval 
operations. Almost all areas of the Sea Power 21 concept would be affected. China could 
use this inoperability of U.S. GPS to launch deadly attacks against U.S. surface forces 
while U.S. combat teams are adjusting to acquire situational awareness.222 
However, U.S. reconnaissance satellites could easily view the large missiles in 
plan site as China’s Second Artillery readied them for launch. On average, it takes 18 
hours to fuel these missiles.223 More than likely, constant U.S. reconnaissance satellites 
overflight would notice this reading process. If all three or four launch sites appeared to 
be readying for a possible attack, the U.S. could exercise an option to launch a pre-
emptive attack, taking these facilities out of commission, and the survivability of 
reconnaissance satellites could provide the imagery necessary to maintain situational 
awareness of the Chinese deep space launch facilities.  If targeting of GPS satellite were 
to be successful, naval surface forces would still be able to employ weapons.  Although 
precision strike missions might be degraded, ships will still switch from a true bearing to 
a relative bearing. Advance warning may provide U.S. forces to shift to non-precision 
weapons options and begin to base position data on GPS sources.  
4.  Attacks on Communication Satellites  
A preemptive attack on U.S. communication satellites could appear to be much 
like a preemptive attack on GPS satellites. Just like GPS satellites, communication 
satellites are located in deep space, GEO orbit. Reaching GEO orbit requires larger 
missiles that most likely need to be launched from a fixed facility. The readying of these  
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missiles most likely would be exposed to reconnaissance satellites. Therefore, 
reconnaissance satellites provide the first warning against an attack on communication 
satellites.  
If an attack centered on communication satellites it does not appear that China 
could disable all communication satellites. First, the launch facilities cannot launch 
enough missiles in comparison to the number of U.S. military communication satellites. 
Second, if U.S. military commutation satellites were to be taken out, more than likely 
Navy TENCAP could enable to the immediate use of civil satellites to fulfill the 
communication needs. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S. 
military was able to transfer over 14 billion bits per second using 84% of civil satellites. 
224 Most of the U.S. satellites military and civil satellites in Figure 6 are communication 
satellites.  
FORCEnet is mostly dependent on communication satellites, so it can be assumed 
that the robust U.S. communication satellite system could support this need.   
E.  CHAPTER III CONCLUSION  
China would find it difficult to create a successful surprise attack on U.S. low 
earth orbit space assets, and if conducting a covert attack, would have limited success. 
The PLA would most likely need to position its TELs throughout China in advance, but 
due to the predictable orbit of low earth orbit satellites intelligence annalists would foil 
the coming attack and maneuver the satellites to a safe orbit, avoiding Chinese targeting 
and the ability to maneuver the TELs into position to pose a threat. Targeting NOSS 
satellites would prove harder to conceal. If attacks were to occur, Navy TENCAP could 
quickly be used to apply overlap coverage in place of the lost assets. Recent PLA Second 
Artillery exercises are aimed at foiling the U.S. ability use reconnaissance satellites to 
track movements. If reconnaissance satellites are secure, attacks on other space assets are 
more difficult to achieve. Any attack to the space segment of GPS would have to be 
initiated from a launch facility capable of reaching medium earth orbit. This would 
require missiles to most likely be readied and fueled out in the open for reconnaissance 
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satellites to view. China is known to be developing a fourth deep space launch facility 
and the KT-2 ASAT missile that can reach GEO orbit. If China were able to conduct an 
attack on GPS satellites it could cripple the U.S. naval surface force, therefore, space 
reconnaissance of China’s launch facilities is critical for the ability of the Navy to 
promote its Sea Power 21 concepts with the threat of attacks upon the GPS space 
segment. Lastly, due to the similar reasons of deep space launch, attacks on 
communication satellites would be nearly impossible to conduct without indications and 
warnings. With the continued commercial use of communication satellites in U.S. 
military operations, China will find it nearly impossible to cripple the communication 
infrastructure. China could not successfully attack U.S. space assets and create a shift in 
the balance of power. Although it appears that China might contain an offense dominate 
position due to its possession of ASAT weapon, it has in fact incorrectly measured its 
ability to create a shift in the balance of power.      
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines Chinese perceptions concerning its ASAT weapon and the 
operational implications of the ASAT weapon concerning the U.S. Navy surface forces. 
Within a strategic theoretical dimension, the reality of the Chinese ASAT weapon is 
considered with regards to its ability to create an operational advantage that is thought to 
influence the decision to go to war. The thesis focuses primarily on the Chinese 
perception that they may be able to create a temporal situation that could favor its offense 
capability by using an ASAT weapon, offense defense. It also explores if the Chinese 
perception of offense dominance is real, or imagined to be real, as viewed through the 
lens of Stephen Van Evera’s Offense, Defense and the Causes of War Theory. It shows 
that China’s sense of being able to shift the strategic balance in its favors was not real, 
but was incorrectly assessed. This incorrect assessment is known as false optimism. False 
optimism leads states to join wars that they would not normally if they foresaw the 
outcome. History has demonstrated the false optimism is the cause to many wars. Now 
that China possesses the ASAT the likelihood of war breaking out in the Taiwan Strait is 
greater than before.   
China’s sense of offense dominance has been created by aggregate factors leading 
to offense dominance, and in all of these areas China’s concerns run counter to U.S. 
interests. Additionally, China’s sense of false optimism is a result of its continued secrecy 
and its emphasis on being able to use the first strike maneuver to create a shift in the 
strategic balance between it and the United States. China will possibly use its ASAT 
weapon against the United States when it has decided that reunification with Taiwan 
cannot be achieved through peaceful measures and U.S. naval forces are in the region to 
promote stability.    
Chapter II demonstrated that China’s position were at odds with the interests of 
the United States, thus creating the need to develop the means to counter power 
projection capabilities of the United States. The ASAT weapon appears to be a logical 
outcome of its military modernization, and one that allows them to perceive that they are 
closer to being able to fight a war under conditions of information.     
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China’s interest in reunifying with Taiwan is the driving forces in developing 
weapons capable of blunting U.S. military power, especially the U.S. Navy. China’s 
geographical ambitions and its continued legislation to reunite with Taiwan are evidence 
that development of the ASAT weapon may be used in a potential confrontation with the 
United States. China’s military modernization and its doctrine imply that is preparing to 
confront the United States by launching first strike attacks on its space assets. 
Additionally, China’s false optimism is a result of its insistence that it must take a first 
strike move, yet in order to achieve this shift in the military balance of power it must 
maintain a level of secrecy. It is quite reasonable to assume that the next time U.S. naval 
forces are operating near China’s periphery due to heightened tensions between China 
and Taiwan, U.S. space assets could be targeted to create in China’s perception a 
situation of offense dominance.    
China’s ability to conduct a devastating first strike against U.S. space assets is 
very limited, as Chapter III explored. This chapter concludes that China will currently 
find it difficult to create a successful surprise attack on U.S. low earth orbit space assets; 
therefore making surprise attacks on other space assets nearly impossible. To conduct an 
attack on low earth orbit assets, the PLA would most likely need to position its mobile 
launchers throughout China in advance, but due to the predictable orbit of low earth orbit 
satellites intelligence analysts could predict a surprise attack in the making. Maneuvering 
the satellites to a safe orbit and avoiding Chinese targeting appears to be a reasonable 
solution. Potential targeting of NOSS satellites would also prove difficult to conceal. If 
attacks on space assets were to occur, Navy TENCAP could quickly be used to apply 
overlap coverage. 
Any attack to the space segment of GPS would have to be initiated from a launch 
facility capable of reaching medium earth orbit. This most likely would require missiles 
to be readied and fueled out in the open for reconnaissance satellites to view. China is 
known to be developing a fourth deep space launch facility and the KT-2 ASAT missile 
that can reach GEO orbit. If China were able to conduct an attack on GPS satellites it 
could limit the U.S. naval surface force, but not totally cripple ability to conduct offense 
operations. Space reconnaissance of China’s launch facilities is critical for the ability of 
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the Navy to prevent a surprise attack against GPS and, if overtly attacked give sufficient 
warning for alternate weapon employment. Lastly, due to the similar reasons of deep 
space launch, attacks on communication satellites would be nearly impossible to conduct 
without indications and warnings. With the continued commercial use of communication 
satellites in U.S. military operations, China will find it nearly impossible to cripple the 
communication infrastructure.  
Naval surface forces would be able to conduct defensive operations if space assets 
were to become targets. Although the United States might find Chinese launch facilities 
reading missiles, it appears that conducting pre-emptive attacks would not result. Reading 
its launch facilities is not an act of war, and most likely, any first strike against the United 
States would have to follow. U.S. naval surface forces are left with little choice but to 
wait for a coming Chinese space attack. However, once it has become obvious that China 
is willing to risk war with the United States, it will be able to use non-precision weapons 
in place of precision weapons. Certainly, the ability to conduct joint operations will not 
be hindered due to redundancy of communication satellites. More than likely the U.S. Air 
Force will be able to work in tandem with naval forces.   
To better protect is interest in space and its ability to project military power, the 
United States should ensure that it maintains sufficient reconnaissance ability. With the 
Chinese ability to shot down low earth orbit satellites and the doctrine that appears 
favoring striking space assets, reconnaissance satellites have now become a more critical 
element of surface warfare. Most importantly, once space assets have become the targets 
of Chinese aggression, it should also be assumed that it also embark in other forms of 
asymmetric warfare that some observers of China’s military modernization have 
suggested.    
China is moving closer to what it perceives as being able to confront the U.S. 
military.   
 
  70
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  71
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Alden, Joseph W. “The Race for Sea Control.” Requirements for graduation from the 
Joint Military Operations Department, United States Naval War College, (2006), 
stinet.dtic.mil (accessed: May 25, 2008).  
“An Assessment and Analysis of PLA Publications.” Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (2005), www.opensource.gov (accessed July 17, 2008).  
Bao. Shxiu. “Dominance in Space.” Beijing Review, no. 11 (2007), 
https://www.bjreview.com (accessed May 2, 2008).  
Bitzinger, Richard A. “China’s Revolution in Military Affairs: Good Enough for 
Government Work.” RSIS Commentaries, www.rsis.edu.sg, (accessed June 6, 
2008).  
Blank, Stephen J. “China’s Military Power: Shadow over Central Asia.” Lexington 
Institute, (2006), http://lexingtoninstitute.org (accessed September 5, 2007). 
Blasko, Dennis J. “The Pentagon-PLA Disconnect: China’s Self Assessments of Its 
Military Capabilities.” China Brief, Jamestown Foundation 8, no. 14 (2008): 10, 
http://www.jamestown.org (accessed July 5, 2008).  
Bradsher, Keith. “Taiwan Leader Dismisses Hu Overture.” New York Times, October 18, 
2007, www.nytimes.com (accessed July 31, 2008).  
Burrows, William E. This New Ocean. New York, Random House, 1998.  
“China and Russia Jointly Submitted the Draft Treaty on PPWT to the Conference on 
Disarmament.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China, 
(February 12, 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.cn (accessed August 7, 2008). 
“China to ‘Pay Any Price’ for National Unity.” The China Daily, (November 11, 2003), 
http://www.chinadaily.com (accessed June 19, 2008).  
“Chinese Colonel Sees Arms in Space.” The Washington Times, (January 26, 2007), 
http://www.washtimes.com (accessed July 28, 2008). 
Chinese ASAT Scenario, http://celestrak.com/events/asat.asp (accessed May 17, 2008). 
Cliff, Roger and others. Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and 
Their Implications for the United States. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
(2007), www.rand.org (accessed February 3, 2008).  
Cole, Bernard D. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century. 
Annapolis: MD, 2000. 
  72
Craft, John. “Providing Mapping Capabilities, Spatial Resolution and Geolocation 
Ability: Geoeye’s Next Generation Imagery Satellites.” Geo Information, vol. 11, 
no. 4, (June 2008), http://fluidbook.microdesign.nl/geoinformatics/04-2008/, 18-
19.  
Dambaugh, Karry. “Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices.” CRS 
Report to Congress #RL33510 (2008): 13-14.  
Deutsch, Kenneth. Statement to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Space Hearing. March 4, 2008 (accessed July 15, 2008).  
“Developing a New Maritime Strategy.” Rhumblines, (September 12, 2006), 
https://www.chinfo.navy.mil (accessed August 20, 2008).  
Dutton, Peter A. “China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control.” 
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
(February 27, 2008), http://www.uscc.gov (accessed July 17, 2008).  
“Ensuring Space Security.” Union of Concerned Scientists, (May 2006), 
https://www.ucsusa.org (accessed August 29, 2008).  
Farricker, Christopher M. “Chinese Military Modernization and the Future of Taiwan.” 
Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003.  
Finkelstein, David. China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the 
Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Edited by James C. 
Mulvenon and David Finkelstein. Alexandria, VA: CAN, (2005), www.cna.org 
(accessed September 2007). 
Finkelstein, David. Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of 
China’s Military. Edited by Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell. Carlisle, PA: 
GPO, 2007. 
Finkelstien. David M. The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition. Edited by 
Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti. Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University, 2003.  
Forden, Geoffery. “How China Loses the Coming Space War (Part 1).” Wired, (January 
10, 2008), http://blog.wired.com (accessed January 20, 2008).  
_____. “How China Loses the Coming Space War (Part 2).” Wired, (January 10, 2008), 
http://blog.wired.com (accessed January 20, 2008) 
Friedman, Norman. Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-
Centric Warfare. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.  
  73
Gething, Michael J. “Imagery Intelligence: Boom Time for Image Intelligence as Digital 
Exploitation Burgeons.” Jane’s, (2001): https://www.janes.com (accessed July 30, 
2007). 
Gill, Bates and Martin Kleiber. “China’s Space Odyssey.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 86, no. 3 
(May-June 2007), 2-3.  
Hagt, Eric. “The U.S. Satellite Shootdown: China’s Response.” Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists, (March 5, 2008), http://www.thebulletin.org (accessed June 18, 2008).  
Harrington, Cathy. “Chinese ASAT Test Prompts U.S. Rethink.” Jane’s Online, (2007), 
https://www.janes.com (accessed July 30, 2007). 
Hui, Zhang. “Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective.” 24, 
www.wsichina.org (accessed July 24, 2008).  
Juan, Chen. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001.  
Kan, Shirley. “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test.” Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) Report to Congress #RS22652 (2007): 1, 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/ (accessed July 8, 2007).  
Kelso, T.S. “Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris on the 
Space Environment.” http://www.celestrak.com (accessed May 17, 2008).  
“KT-1 (KaiTuoZhe-1) Space Launch Vehicle.” (January 19, 2007), 
www.Sinodefense.com (accessed July 30, 2008). 
Lague, “China Steps up Military Focus on Taiwan.” The New York Times, (October 10, 
2007), http://query.nytimes.com (accessed May 24, 2008).  
Lambakis, Steven. “Space Control in Desert Storm and Beyond.” Orbis 39, no. 3 (1995): 
417-433.  
“Major U.S. Civilian Satellites in Military Use.” MILNET, https://www.milnet.com 
(accessed August 27, 2008).  
Marder, Eugene. “How China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test Can Breathe New Life into 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.” Center for Defense Information (CDI) 
(2008), https://www.cdi.org (accessed July 7, 2008).  
Mulvenon, James C. and others. Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and 
Implications for the Department of Defense. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
2005.  
  74
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). http://www.nga-earth.org (accessed 
August 27, 2008).  
National Maritime Strategy. A Cooperative Strategy of the 21st Century Seapower, 2007.  
Naval Studies Board. The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities, 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, (2005), http://books.nap.edu 
(accessed January 24, 2008). 
Navy Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) FAS. http://www.fas.org 
(accessed August 20, 2008).  
“Obrimage Receives Clearview Contract Award from NGA.” (March 29, 2004), 
http://geoeye.mediaroom.com/ (accessed August 18, 2008). 
O’Rourke, Ronald. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for the U.S. Navy 
Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress.” (CRS), #RL33153 (2008): 
41, http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/ (accessed July 2008). 
Pillsbury, Michael. “China’s Military Strategy toward the U.S.: A View from Open 
Sources.” United States-China Economic and Security Commission, 
www.uscc.gov (accessed July 28, 2007).  
“PLA Training Emphasizes Countermeasures against Imagery Reconnaissance.” Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (2007), www.opensource.gov (accessed July 17, 
2008). 
Pollpeter, Kevin. ‘The Stars of China’s Space Program: The Rise of a “Space Gang”? 
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, vol. 7, Issue 17, (September 19, 2007), 
http://www.jamestown.org (accessed June 20, 2008).  
Pollpeter, Kevin. Building for the Future: China’s Progress in Space Technology during 
the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response. Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 
2008.  
Ross. Robert S. “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility and 
Use of Force.” International Security, vol. 25, no. 2, 2000.  
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966. 
Shalal-Esa. Andrea. “GeoEye Signs Deal to Provide Imagery to Google.” Reuters, 
(August 28, 2008), http://news.yahoo.com.  
Shambaugh, David. Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects. 
California, University of California Press, 2002.  
Shirk, Susan L. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.  
  75
Sinodefense.com, www.Sinodefense.com (accessed July 27, 2008).  
“Sixteenth Time Lucky? Taiwan Seeks UN Spot Again.” Asia One News, July 30, 2008, 
https://asiaone.com (accessed July 31, 2008).  
Smith, Marcia S. “China’s Space Program: An Overview.” CRS Report to Congress 
#RS21641 (2006): 4, http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRS/ (accessed June 7, 
2007).  
“Space Security 2007.” Space Security. (2007), 
http://www.spacesecurity.org/publications (accessed March 12, 2008).  
Stokes, Mark. China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States. 
Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, 
(1999), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil (accessed September 1, 
2007). 
“Study: U.S. Army Stretched to Breaking Point.” China Daily, (January 25, 2006), 
www.chinadaily.com (accessed September 3, 2007).  
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, General Military Law. U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 48, 
Sections 3301-3316 (1979), 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title22/title22.html (accessed July 19, 2008).  
Tellis, Ashley J. “China’s Military Space Strategy.” Survival. 49 (September 2007):3, 41-
72.  
The Anti-Secession Law, 2005.  
The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002.  
The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2006.  
The Navy’s Needs in Space for Providing Future Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, (2005), https://www.nap.edu (accessed June 3, 2008).  
The Report to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 
Organization. 2001, https://www.dod.mil (accessed July 2007). 
“The Anti-Secession Law.” The People’s Daily Online, (March 14, 2005), 
http://english.people.com (accessed June 19, 2008). 
“The Untimely Anti-Ballistic Missile System.” The People’s Daily Online, June 15, 
2007, http://english.people.com.cn (accessed July 20, 2008).  
Thomas. Timothy L. Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information-War Theory and Practice from 
1995-2003. Fort Leavenworth: GPO, 2004.  
  76
Tsang. Steve. If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics. New 
York: Routledge, 2006.  
“U.S. Space Based Reconnaissance Reinforced.” Jane’s, (October 17, 2001), 
http://www.janes.com (accessed August 25, 2008).  
United States Department of Defense. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
2008. Washington, D.C., (2008), http://www.defenselink.mil (accessed March 25, 
2008).  
Van Evera Stephen, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1999. 
_____. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.” International Security 22 no. 4 
(1998): 9.  
Vick, Charles P. “Improved- Advanced Crystal/ IKON/ “KH-12”.” Global Security, 
(April 25, 2007), http://www.globalsecurity.org, (accessed August 25, 2008).  
Waltz, Kenneth N. Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2001.  
Wang, Baocum and Fei Li. Information Warfare, trans. Michael Pillsbury. Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998. 
Wang, Jianwei. “Time for “New” Thinking on Taiwan.” China Security, vol. 4, no. 1 
Winter 2008, 110-126. 
Ward, Andrew. “U.S. Considers More Troops for Afghanistan.” Financial Times, (July 
18, 2008), http://www.ft.com (accessed July 18, 2008).  
Watson. Cynthia A. The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition. Edited by 
Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti. Washington D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 2003.  
White Paper – The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue. (2000), http://www.china-
embassy.org (accessed June 20, 2008). 
Winter, Donald C. “Navy Transformation: A Stable, Long-Term View.” March 19, 2007, 
Heritage Lecture 1004, http://www.heritage.org (accessed July 28, 2007).  
Wortez, Larry M. “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare: Emerging 
United States-China Military Competition.” American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
(2007): 2, http://www.aei.org (accessed September 17, 2007).  
_____. “China and the Battlefield in Space.” The Heritage Foundation, (2003), 
http://www.heritage.org (accessed July 17, 2008).  
  77
Wright, David, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund. The Physics of Space Security: A 
Reference Manual. Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
(2005), http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/the-physics-of-
space-security.html, (accessed August 29, 2008). 
Xin, Dingding. “New Carrier Rocket Series to be Built.” China Daily.  
Yunzhu, Yao. “The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the Chinese PLA from 1985 to 
1995.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis VI, no. 2 (1995): 61-62.  
Zhongchang, Shen and others. 21st Century Naval Warfare, trans. Michael Pillsbury. 
First published in the China Military Science.  
 
  78
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  79
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
